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This book is an analysis of the illegal alien labor market. It 
develops and tests hypotheses about the characteristics of the 
employment of illegal aliens, such as wages, investments in job 
training, job mobility, and workplace and employer characteristics. 
It also analyzes the employers of illegal aliens and how they differ 
from other employers. The empirical analysis is largely based on a 
unique data file. Detailed demographic and labor market data were 
transcribed from a sample of Immigration and Naturalization 
Services (INS) apprehension reports on illegal aliens in the Chicago 
metropolitan area. This was followed by an extensive interview of 
businesses in the Chicago metropolitan area, of whom half were 
identified by the illegal ah©ens and half were randomly selected. As 
a result it was possible to link data on the characteristics of illegal 
aliens to the survey responses of their employers, creating a unique 
employee-employer data file. Furthermore, the double-blind meth 
odology of the employer survey permits the analysis of the similar 
ities and differences between employers known to have hired an 
illegal alien and randomly selected employers. No comparable data 
has ever been constructed for the systematic study of illegal aliens.
/. The Background
Illegal aliens are individuals whose presence in the United States 
is in violation of the law. Some become illegal aliens as a result of 
a surreptitious entry: that is, by entering the U.S. without a proper 
inspection of their documents by INS border officials. This is
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referred to as "entry without inspection," and in INS parlance these 
aliens are called "EWIs." They form the vast majority of the annual 
flow, as well as the majority of the stock of illegal aliens residing in 
the U.S. Others become illegal aliens because they violate a 
condition of a lawfully permitted entry. "Visa abusers" include 
foreign students who work in violation of their visas, tourists who 
stay longer than is permitted, and "temporary workers" (e.g., 
seasonal farm workers) who either work in sectors not covered by 
their permits or who remain longer than is allowed. Less numerous 
are those who enter with fraudulently obtained documents, which 
may be outright counterfeit visas or doctored documents. And there 
are those seamen, tourists and airline personnel who literally "jump 
ship" to enter the United States.
For obvious reasons the exact number of illegal aliens cannot be 
estimated with precision. This is a population which seeks to hide its 
identity and to avoid contact with governmental authorities. A 
recent review of various studies that have attempted to use indirect 
techniques to estimate the size of the resident illegal alien popula 
tion suggests that in 1980 there were between 3.5 and 6.0 million, 
about half of whom were Mexican nationals (Siegel, Passel and 
Robinson, 1981). The large illegal alien flows across the border 
since then, deteriorating economic conditions in Mexico, prospects 
for amnesty, and other factors suggest that the number has grown 
since 1980. Since most newly arrived illegal aliens are young adults 
who come in search of work, a disproportionate number are in the 
labor force. By 1986 there may have been as many as 4 million 
illegal alien workers, comprising about 4 percent of the U.S. labor 
force. Surely the presence of such a large and growing component 
of the population and the labor force must have far-reaching effects.
For the past decade, the Executive Branch and Congress have 
been concerned with controlling illegal immigration. Starting with 
the Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens under President 
Ford, which issued its report in 1976, through the task forces and 
the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (1981 
report) created during the Carter administration, and the further
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study groups and Congressional hearings during the Reagan ad 
ministration, illegal aliens have been a primary focus of political 
and media attention. 1
A compromise legislative package on illegal aliens that had been 
under discussion for a decade included penalties against employers 
who knowingly hire illegal aliens (referred to as "employer 
sanctions"), amnesty (or legalization) for illegal aliens who could 
prove they were in the U.S. prior to a specified date, and increased 
resources for INS enforcement activities. Quite unexpectedly, in the 
closing days of the legislative session, Congress passed and the 
President signed the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986. 2 This is the most sweeping immigration legislation since the 
1965 Amendments which abolished the "national origins" quota 
system. The 1986 Act included employer sanctions, amnesty for 
illegal aliens who have continuously resided in the U.S. since 
January 1, 1982, and promises of increased enforcement resources, 
as well as other less central provisions. The implementation of the 
employer sanctions and legalization provisions began in the first 
half of 1987, and it will be some time before it will be possible to 
ascertain their consequences. Over 2% million illegal aliens have 
received legal status under the various amnesty provisions in the 
1986 legislation.
Rather than laying to rest the illegal alien issue, the 1986 Act is a 
public acknowledgment that past policies failed. There is consider 
able skepticism that the new policies will succeed. Amnesty, in 
tended to wipe the slate clean, may encourage additional illegal 
migration in the expectation of fraudulently qualifying for amnesty 
under the current act, and in the expectation that there will be 
future amnesties. Employer sanctions may have little if any effec 
tiveness because of the difficulty of enforcement, particularly in the 
face of the nation©s abhorrence of a national identity card system. 
Skeptics suggest that the promised resources for the enforcement of 
employer sanctions and for INS border and interior enforcement 
activities are not likely to be forthcoming. Since the political process
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failed to provide INS with adequate resources in the past, there is 
no reason to believe meaningful enforcement resources will be 
provided in the future.
Furthermore, the skeptics argue, as long as there are such large 
differences in economic well-being between the U.S. and so many 
other countries in particular, our southern neighbor Mexico the 
incentive for illegal migration will continue. The most effective 
deterrent, additional penalties against the illegal aliens themselves, 
was not seriously considered in the debate over immigration reform. 
If anything, a contrary approach was taken rewarding with legal 
status those who entered the U.S. illegally, while continuing to deny 
visas to millions of applicants who have obeyed U.S. immigration 
law. 3
It is clear that the illegal alien issue has not been legislated away 
by the 1986 Act. It is also clear that there is still too little rigorous 
social science research for the development of a deeper understand 
ing of the illegal alien labor market, which is a prerequisite to the 
development of effective public policy.
Research on the labor market activities of illegal aliens has been 
hampered by the virtual absence of systematic and reliable data. 
This is not surprising illegal aliens have an incentive to avoid 
revealing their status to an interviewer or in a questionnaire. As a 
result, anthropological or ethnographic approaches have sometimes 
been used by investigators. This type of research is subject to many 
pitfalls, including the problems inherent in small samples, selective 
respondents, and respondents reporting what they think the inves 
tigator wishes to hear. Others have relied on censored or preselected 
samples of illegal aliens, such as those who return to their home 
villages (Cornelius, 1976, and Diez-Canedo, 1980), have applied for 
social welfare benefits (Van Arsdol et al., 1978), or have been 
apprehended (North and Houstoun, 1976). Yet with few excep 
tions, even these techniques have not generated adequate data for 
labor market analysis.
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Although limited, the research to date on the labor market 
opportunities and behavior of illegal aliens suggests that this topic 
is not beyond fruitful study. David North and Marion Houstoun 
(1976) interviewed nearly 800 apprehended illegal aliens in 1975, 
demonstrating that the illegal aliens would respond to survey 
interviews and reporting in tabular form descriptive statistics on the 
labor market and demographic characteristics of the aliens. Using 
the North-Houstoun data, it has been shown (Chiswick, 1984) that 
econometric techniques can usefully be applied to the analysis of 
illegal alien labor market activities. Earnings in the U.S. were found 
to rise with schooling level, labor market experience in the U.S., and 
labor market experience in the country of origin, and that Mexican 
illegal aliens earned less than those of Canadian and European 
origins. Using a sample of Mexican-origin women in California 
who reported their legal status, Simon and DeLey (1984) analyzed 
the demographic and labor market characteristics of female illegal 
aliens.
Several studies have attempted to address the issue of "exploi 
tation," that is, whether illegal aliens have lower status jobs or get 
paid less than other workers (see, for example, the summary and 
analysis in Massey, 1987). The key to the answer appears to be: 
which "other workers?" Illegal aliens, particularly those from 
Mexico, have a lower occupational attainment and lower earnings 
than workers in general. However, the gap apparently disappears 
when they are compared to other immigrants (by country of origin) 
with the same level of schooling and labor market experience in the 
U.S. Illegal aliens do apparently make fewer investments specific to 
the U.S. labor market, presumably because they and their employ 
ers are aware of a potentially less permanent attachment to this 
country.
These studies, and others, suggest that there can be substantial 
increases in our knowledge from the current very low base.4 The 
purpose of this project is to learn more about the labor market 
opportunities, role and impact of illegal aliens in urban areas of the
6 CHAPTER 1
U.S. This is done through the analysis of data on apprehended 
illegal aliens and their employers in the Chicago metropolitan area 
labor market.
//. The Survey
A more complete analysis of illegal alien labor market behavior 
requires information on the characteristics of both the illegal aliens 
and their employers. Data on where, with whom, and under what 
circumstances illegal aliens work would be difficult to acquire from 
the illegal aliens. First, sampling illegal aliens is difficult; and even 
when they are identified, the administration of a lengthy question 
naire in a variety of languages other than English would require 
complex and costly survey procedures. Second, there are many 
characteristics of the employer that may not be known to a typical 
worker. These characteristics include the wage structure of the firm, 
percent unionized, hiring policies and practices, and on-the-job 
training opportunities. This information would be even less accu 
rate if obtained from workers who are relatively new to the country, 
and hence are less familiar with the language and labor market 
institutions, and are likely to have fewer years of experience with 
their current employer.
It was therefore decided that an analysis of the labor market 
behavior of illegal aliens required data on the person©s demographic 
characteristics to be derived from the alien as well as data on the 
workplace to be derived from the employer. It was concluded that 
the most cost-effective and statistically reliable method for obtain 
ing these data would be through combining administrative records 
on the illegal aliens with a survey of their employers.
Whenever an illegal alien is apprehended by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Services (INS), a Record of Deportable Alien, 
referred to by its form number, 1-213, is completed. The form 
includes questions on demographic characteristics (e.g., age, sex, 
marital status), on nationality and immigrant status (e.g., country 
of birth, nationality, date of entry, method and place of entry), and
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on the person©s labor market experience (e.g., whether employed, 
salary, and the name and address of the current or most recent 
employer). The alien©s identification of the employer was used to 
obtain a sample of employers of illegal aliens that could then be 
interviewed about the characteristics of the establishment and its 
employees. The matching of data on the alien©s characteristics and 
the employer©s characteristics generates a unique data file. A 
limitation of the methodology is that INS apprehensions may not 
constitute a random sample of the resident illegal alien population.
To understand the characteristics of the employers of illegal 
aliens, a benchmark is needed. It is not possible to determine which 
firms have never employed illegal aliens. As an alternative, ran 
domly selected employers can serve as the basis of comparison. 
Hence, the employer survey consists of two sets of employers 
 those identified by apprehended illegal aliens on the 1-213 and 
those randomly selected from directories of establishments but 
matched by industry to the illegal alien employers.
By combining the data on the 1-213 with the employer©s re 
sponses, it is possible to analyze the labor market adjustment of 
illegal aliens. For example, to what extent do the earnings of illegal 
aliens vary not only with their age and duration of residence in the 
U.S., but also with the wage structure of their employer, the size of 
the establishment, the degree of unionization, and the racial/ethnic 
composition of co-workers? In addition, it is possible to trace the 
variation in employer (workplace) characteristics by the nationality 
and duration of residence in the U.S. of the illegal alien. For 
example, to what extent do illegal aliens in the U.S. a longer period 
of time work in larger, more highly unionized establishments that 
provide more on-the-job training?
Furthermore, the sample permits comparing the characteristics of 
establishments known to have employed an illegal alien with 
randomly selected establishments in the same industry. It is there 
fore possible to determine systematic differences between these 
employers by analyzing a variety of variables, including degree of
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unionization, ethnic heterogeneity, skill level, wage structure, and 
on-the-job training opportunities, among other characteristics.
The Chicago metropolitan area was selected as the site for the 
survey because it has a large, diversified economy and a large illegal 
alien population from a wide range of countries of origin. 5 This 
permits an analysis of one type of variation of particular interest for 
the study of illegal aliens, differences in labor market characteristics 
and employer characteristics by country of origin. It is particularly 
important to be able to distinguish between those of Mexican and 
non-Mexican origin in studies of this labor market. By limiting the 
analysis to only one site, findings from the analysis are not 
confounded by systematic variations that may exist across sites. 
Since the survey methodology is not site-specific, the procedures 
could be replicated elsewhere.
///. Chapter Outline
Chapter 2 sets the stage for the discussion of the survey and the 
data analysis. Illegal aliens are defined and there is a discussion of 
the number and characteristics of illegal aliens in the U.S. and 
Illinois. Since illegal immigration can only be understood as a result 
of the lack of concordance between the incentives for migrating and 
the provisions for lawful migration, both issues are discussed.
The survey methodology is presented in chapter 3. It includes the 
unique sampling plan and the interviewing procedures.6 This is 
followed by an analysis of the effectiveness of the overall survey 
design and particular features of the survey.
The illegal alien is treated as the unit of observation in chapter 4. 
In addition to presentation of descriptive statistics, multiple regres 
sion analyses are reported for the wages of the illegal aliens. The 
wage rate analyses take advantage of the unique data features and 
analyze, in addition to the usual demographic and skill variables 
(such as marital status, labor market experience and country of
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origin), the relation between employer characteristics and wages. 
This is followed by an analysis of how the characteristics of the 
employers of illegal aliens vary by the country of origin and 
duration of U.S. residence of the aliens. Insights from the data 
analysis for this study, as well as other studies, are explored in the 
discussion of employer "exploitation" of illegal aliens.
The establishments become the unit of observation in chapter 5. 
The chapter begins with the some general descriptive statistics. It 
then develops and tests a model of the differences between employ 
ers of illegal aliens and randomly selected employers. An attempt is 
made to study the "underground economy" through an analysis of 
the differences between the two sets of employers. On-the-job 
training, another key issue in the discussion of illegal alien labor 
markets, is analyzed to test for differences between the two samples 
of employers. Finally, there is an analysis of employer differences in 
their understanding of their legal liabilities in the hiring of workers. 
Particular attention is given to their perception, or more accurately 
nonperception, regarding hiring foreign-born workers in general, 
and illegal aliens in particular.
This study closes in chapter 6 with a summary of the major 
findings, a synthesis of their implications, and an analysis of the 
likely effectiveness of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986.
NOTES
1 My own involvement with illegal alien research and policy began in 1975 when 
then-Attorney General Edward Levi, who was also chairman of the Domestic 
Council Committee on Illegal Aliens, asked the Council of Economic Advisers 
to provide technical assistance to the committee. As the CEA©s Senior Staff 
Economist in human resources I was assigned to the task. I quickly discovered 
that very little was known about illegal aliens, or even immigrants in general. In 
part because of the clandestine nature of the illegal alien population and limited 
research resources, the increase in knowledge about illegal aliens over the decade 
has been quite small.
2 The Act can be found in U.S. House of Representatives (1986). For an analysis 
of the provisions and likely consequences of the 1986 Act see Chiswick (1988).
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3 Although most applicants for legalization will have to demonstrate they have 
resided "continuously" in the U.S. for at least five years, less stringent provisions 
apply for seasonal farm workers. Under special provisions in the 1986 Act, 
seasonal agricultural workers (SAWs) may be granted amnesty if they worked in 
U.S. perishable crop agriculture for at least 90 days in 1986. About one-fifth of 
those granted amnesty applied under the SAW provisions.
4 Other studies of illegal aliens that are relevant for understanding their decision 
to migrate illegally, their adjustment in the U.S., and their impact include 
Bustamante (1977), Cross and Sandos (1981), Davidson (1981), Cardenas 
(1979), Huddle, Corwin and MacDonald (1985), Papandemetriou and DiMarzio 
(1986); Piore (1979), Portes (1977), Van Arsdol et al. (1978). See also the special 
issue of the International Migration Review, entitled Irregular Migration: An 
International Perspective (Fall 1984).
5 The classic analysis of employer-based urban labor market data also used 
Chicago as the survey site. See Rees and Shultz (1970).
6 For a more detailed discussion see Chiswick (1985, Volume I, chapters 2 and 3). 
The 1-213 abstract form, establishment questionnaire, interviewer training 
manual and other documents for the survey are reproduced in Chiswick (1985, 
Volume II).
This chapter is concerned with setting the stage for the survey and 
analysis presented in subsequent chapters. Illegal aliens are defined 
in section I. Because illegal migration can be understood only in the 
context of legal immigration, section II presents a summary of 
current immigration law. This is followed (section III) by an 
analysis of the implications of a divergence between the incentives 
for migrating and the legal migration permitted under current law. 
Not all unsuccessful visa applicants become illegal aliens. Three 
selection processes are involved a desire to migrate, an inability to 
obtain a visa, and the decision to migrate illegally. Implications of 
these selection processes for the characteristics and labor market 
behavior of illegal aliens are developed.
/. Who Are the Illegal Aliens?
Illegal aliens are foreign nationals whose mere presence in the 
United States is in violation of the law or who have violated a 
condition of a legal entry into the country. Persons who entered the 
United States illegally include those who avoided a border inspec 
tion of their international travel documents. This is referred to as 
"entry without inspection," and these illegal aliens are referred to in 
INS parlance as "EWIs." The stereotypical EWI would be a 
Mexican illegal alien who surreptitiously crossed the border at 
night.
Illegal immigrants also include those who gained entry through 
the use of fraudulent documents, such as a counterfeit visa or
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passport, or a fraudulent visa application. This category gained 
recent attention from the denaturalization (i.e., rescinding the 
granting of citizenship) and deportation of aliens who had fraudu 
lently indicated that they had not participated in World War II Nazi 
war-crimes when they applied for entry into the U.S.
Those who "abuse" or violate the conditions of a lawfully 
obtained visa are also illegal aliens. Visa abusers include foreign 
nationals who have remained longer than the time span permitted 
by their tourist, student, guest worker or other type of temporary 
visa or papers that permitted their lawful entry into the U.S. It also 
includes those who violate a condition of their visa, such as working 
in violation of a student or tourist visa.
Illegal aliens exist because the desires of some to be in the United 
States for employment or other purposes come into conflict with 
U.S. efforts to regulate who may enter and remain in this country, 
and under what terms or conditions. Illegal immigration also exists 
because of the imperfect enforcement of immigration law. Illegal 
immigration would end if all attempts at illegal entry or violating a 
condition of a legal entry resulted with perfect certainty in an 
instantaneous apprehension and deportation.
It is not surprising that illegal immigration became an important 
policy issue only after the U.S. imposed a quantitative restriction on 
immigration. The first major source country of illegal immigration 
was China because the first quantitative immigration barriers 
introduced by the U.S. were against Chinese laborers, starting with 
legislation in 1875 banning the immigration of Asian contract 
laborers. Over the past century, as the immigration law has changed 
and there have been shifts in the source countries of those desiring 
to immigrate, the composition of illegal aliens has also changed.
The various categories of illegal aliens are not equally represented 
in the illegal alien population. In INS terminology, apprehended 
illegal aliens are referred to as "deportable aliens located." Nearly 
all "deportable aliens located" accept a "voluntary departure," that 
is, they voluntarily agree to leave the U.S. Some aliens petition to
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remain and therefore require a deportation hearing. Some will be 
successful. For example, an illegal alien who is the spouse of a U.S. 
citizen, where the marriage is deemed to be bonafide, can expect to 
receive an "adjustment of status," that is, to receive a resident alien 
visa. For others, however, the end of the process is a formal 
deportation. In fiscal year 1984, the year in which the employer 
survey was conducted, over 1.2 million deportable aliens were 
located, and over 930,000 aliens were expelled, but there were only 
18,000 formal deportations (Statistical Yearbook, 1986, p. 188).
Of the more than 1.2 million deportable aliens located in fiscal 
year 1984, a rather typical recent year, 96 percent had entered the 
U.S. without inspection (EWIs) (see table 2-1). Mexican nationals, 
who were apprehended EWIs comprised 96.9 percent of all EWI 
apprehensions, or 93.0 percent of all apprehensions of illegal aliens. 
Most of the EWIs are apprehended within hours, if not minutes, of 
entering the U.S. from Mexico, and are returned to the other side of 
the border within a day.
Among the 50,624 non-EWI illegal alien apprehensions in 1984, 
61 percent had violated a visitor visa and 12 percent had violated a 
student visa, primarily by working or staying longer than the visa 
allowed. Another 10 percent were crewmen of ships and aircraft 
who "jumped ship," and for the remaining 17 percent, a host of 
other reasons resulted in their illegal status. Among Eastern Hemi 
spheric illegal aliens from Europe, Asia and Africa the "abuse" 
of a visitor or student visa or jumping ship were the primary reasons 
for an illegal status. Illegal migration is that much more difficult 
when a valid visa (tourist or student) is needed to enter the U.S., 
rather than merely walking across the border.
While the long, thinly guarded border with Mexico facilitates 
uninspected illegal border crossings, it is not sufficient to explain the 
large numbers of Mexican nationals among the illegal alien popu 
lation. The border with Canada is longer and less well guarded. Yet, 
of the 6,924 Canadian illegal aliens apprehended in 1984, almost as 
many had violated a visitor visa (2,985) as had entered without
Table 2-1
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inspection (3,285). Nor does U.S. immigration law grant more legal 
resident alien visas to Canadian than Mexican nationals. In fiscal 
year 1984, more than 57,500 Mexican nationals immigrated legally 
to the U.S., compared to less than 10,800 Canadians.
Easy access may be a necessary condition for widescale attempts 
at illegal entry, but is not a sufficient reason. Differences in 
economic opportunities are a key element in the immigration story. 
The number of apprehensions of nationals per 1,000 population in 
the country of origin was about 11.5 for Mexican nationals and 0.3 
for Canadians. While the gap in economic well-being and consump 
tion between the U.S. and Canada is small, the gap between the 
U.S. and Mexico is very large (table 2-2). The GNP per capita in the 
U.S. is measured to be about 15 percent greater than in Canada, a 
difference that is quite small relative to the measurement problems 
and the costs of migration. However, the U.S. per capita GNP was 
about four times the Mexican magnitude. Compared with the U.S. 
or Canada, infant mortality rates are six times higher in Mexico, the 
population per physician ratio is four times higher, and the number 
of persons per automobile is seven times higher. Furthermore, in 
spite of a rapidly declining fertility rate, the rate of growth of the 
Mexican population is 2 1/2 times the U.S. and Canadian growth 
rates. The divergence in natural rates of increase in the population 
is even greater since the U.S. and Canadian population growth is 
enhanced by substantial net immigration.
Data on country differences in income or consumption per capita 
may not properly reflect opportunities for the same person in each 
of the two countries. Data are generally not available on the income 
or consumption of immigrants pre-and postmigration. One excep 
tion is the North-Houstoun (1976) survey of apprehended illegal 
aliens who in 1975 were asked whether they had in their home in 
their country of origin and in the U.S. electricity, running water, 
and a TV or radio. Of the more than 400 Mexican illegal aliens who 
responded to the question, 39 percent did not have running water in 
Mexico, but only 5 percent did not have it in the U.S. For 
electricity, 26 percent did not have it in Mexico, but only 2 percent
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Table 2-2
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a. Data refer to years 1980-82 unless noted otherwise.
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1985, 105th 
Edition, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986, Tables 1475, 1478, 1480, 
1481, 1486, and 1487.
did not have it in the U.S. A more mixed picture emerges for a TV 
or radio. Of those who had a TV or radio in Mexico, nearly 80 
percent had one or more in the U.S., while two-thirds of those 
without a TV or radio in Mexico had one or more in the U.S. Thus, 
these crude indices of consumption imply substantial improvements 
in levels of real economic well-being even for fairly recent illegal 
aliens. 1
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Another study estimated the net economic gain from working in 
the U.S. for a sample of Mexican aliens employed in the fall 1978 
Hood River Valley (Oregon) apple harvest (Cuthbert and Stevens, 
1981). The workers were young (average age 27 years), with little 
schooling (4.4 years), primarily single (61 percent), disproportion 
ately from the state of Jalisco (51 percent), recently entered the U.S., 
but had prior U.S. harvest experience (6 seasons). These character 
istics were more intense (except for prior U.S. experience) for the 78 
illegal aliens than for the 15 legal aliens in the sample. U.S. earnings 
during the harvest season were six times what the aliens reported 
they could have earned in Mexico. After deducting from U.S. 
earnings the costs of the migration (including payments to alien 
smugglers) and certain additional expenses for living in the U.S., 
Cuthbert and Stevens estimated net U.S. earnings to be three times 
what the migrants could have received in Mexico during the same 
work period.
There has been an increase in EWI apprehensions of Central and 
South American nationals who pass through Mexico on the way to 
the U.S. For example, of the 24,000 El Salvadorian and Guatema 
lan illegal aliens apprehended in 1984, 22,000 were EWIs. Because 
of the difficulties of gaining access to a land border, EWI entries 
from the Eastern Hemisphere are relatively rare.
Any portrait of apprehended illegal aliens is necessarily swamped 
by the preponderance in the data of EWIs, especially Mexican 
EWIs. For several reasons this presents a distorted picture of the 
illegal alien population residing in the U.S. One reason is the extent 
of multiple apprehensions of the same individual. An apprehended 
EWI returned across the Mexican border may merely try again the 
next night, and perhaps appear in the statistics once again! Another 
is that the low cost of crossing the Mexican border, compared to 
other forms of entry, may encourage far greater to and fro 
migration for Mexican nationals than for other nationals, thereby 
increasing the number of apprehensions. A visit home is more costly 
for a Korean illegal alien, not only because of the greater out- 
of-pocket expenses involved in the travel, but also because illegal
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entry is more difficult and a deportation more costly. Finally, the 
relatively low cost per apprehension to the INS when resources are 
placed on the Mexican border may have encouraged a greater 
emphasis on border enforcement. 2 This would increase the repre 
sentation of Mexican EWIs in the apprehension data, and create 
exaggerated impressions as to their preponderance in the illegal 
alien population.
Although apprehensions of illegal aliens are easy to measure, 
these data reflect flows of individuals and INS enforcement policies, 
rather than the stock of illegal aliens residing in the U.S. It has been 
difficult to estimate the size and characteristics of the resident illegal 
alien population. This arises in part because there may be sharp 
seasonal, cyclical and secular changes in the net flow and hence the 
stock of illegal aliens . During the "on-season" (the spring, summer 
and early fall), during peaks in the U.S. business cycle when the 
economy is closer to full employment, and during periods of 
economic distress in the sending countries (in particular Mexico), 
more illegal aliens enter and fewer leave. It is always difficult to 
measure the size and characteristics of a fluid population.
More important, however, is the obvious incentive of illegal 
aliens to avoid revealing their immigration status in an administra 
tive record, a survey or a census. There is no gain to the individual 
from being candid about his or her illegal status, and there is always 
some possibility that revealing the information will result in some 
"cost," such as deportation or the loss of income transfer benefits. 
Indeed, illegal aliens may attempt to avoid revealing even their 
presence or existence to an interviewer or enumerator to reduce the 
probability of deportation. As a result, direct survey research 
techniques cannot be used to study the illegal alien population.
Several studies have attempted to use indirect procedures to 
estimate the number of illegal aliens in the U.S. These methodolo 
gies generally involve three steps. The first step is the estimation of 
the legal resident population (citizen and resident aliens) at a point 
in time. The second step is to "age" that population to a later point
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in time. The third step is to take the difference between the "aged" 
population and the estimated total population in the later time 
period. The difference is the estimated number of illegal aliens. A 
major limitation of this methodology is that each statistic, the 
estimated legal population and the estimated total population, is 
measured with error. The difference between two large numbers, 
each of which is estimated with independent random error, is a 
number with substantial measurement error.3
Nonetheless, the studies that have attempted to measure the stock 
of the illegal alien population are instructive. After reviewing the 
methodology in several studies, three Census Bureau statisticians 
(Siegel, Passel and Robinson, 1981) concluded:
The total number of illegal residents in the United States in some 
recent year, say 1978, is almost certainly below 6.0 million, and may 
be substantially less, possibly only 3.5 to 5.0 million.... The Mexican 
component of the illegally resident population is almost certainly less 
than 3.0 million and may be substantially less, possibly only 1.5 to 2.5 
million. The gross movement into the United States of Mexican 
illegals is considerable, as is reflected in the large numbers of 
apprehensions made by INS, but this "immigration" is largely offset 
by a considerable movement in the opposite direction.
In a more recent study, Passel and Woodrow (1984) estimated the 
number and characteristics of illegal aliens enumerated in the 1980 
Census of Population. They estimated a total of 2.1 million illegal 
aliens, of whom about 55 percent are Mexican nationals. While the 
Passel and Woodrow estimates are lower than those reported by 
Siegel, Passel, and Robinson, a substantial underenumeration of 
illegal aliens in the census is to be expected. If one-third or one-half 
of the actual number of resident illegal aliens avoided enumeration, 
the Passel and Woodrow estimates would imply 3.1 to 4.2 million 
illegal aliens. Passel and Woodrow also estimated the number of 
illegal aliens by state and within states by certain demographic 
characteristics. The precision of these estimates necessarily dimin 
ishes with a smaller degree of aggregation.
Since the survey and data analysis in the following chapters refer 
to the Chicago SMSA and since most illegal aliens who reside in
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Illinois are believed to live in the Chicago SMSA, the Passel and 
Woodrow estimates for Illinois are particularly relevant. Table 2-3 
compares the data on Illinois with the U.S. as a whole. The 
estimated 135,000 illegal aliens in Illinois is 6.6 percent of the 
estimated total resident illegal alien population. The distribution by 
period of entry and age are very similar in Illinois and for the 
country as a whole. About 45 percent of the illegal aliens arrived 
during 1975-80, 30 percent during 1970-74, and 25 percent before 
1970.4 By age, almost two-thirds were 15 to 34 years old in 1980, 
with just under 20 percent less than age 15 and another 20 percent 
age 35 or older. There are somewhat greater differences by country 
of origin. It is estimated that 75 percent of the Illinois illegal aliens 
are from Mexico, compared with 55 percent nationwide. On the 
other hand, Illinois has relatively fewer illegal aliens from other 
Western Hemispheric countries. The proportions of Eastern Hemi 
sphere illegal aliens are, 16.1 percent for Illinois and 21.9 percent 
nationwide. Thus, the Passel and Woodrow estimates suggest that 
illegal aliens in Illinois have demographic characteristics very 
similar to those of illegal aliens nationwide. The primary difference, 
if any, is a greater proportion of Mexican nationals and a lesser 
proportion of other Western Hemispheric illegal aliens in Illinois.
//. Current Immigration Law
An appreciation of the issues involved in illegal immigration can 
be obtained only within the context of the legal avenues for 
immigration. Illegal immigration, whether permanent or tempo 
rary, may, but need not, arise when opportunities for legal immi 
gration are closed.
Current immigration law has its basis in the 1965 Amendments to 
the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act. The 1952 Act was 
largely a recodification of existing law. The 1965 Amendments 
liberalized immigration restrictions facing eastern and southern 
Europe and Asia, but was restrictive with regards to northwestern 
Europe and the Western Hemisphere. The 1965 Amendments
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Table 2-3
Estimated Number and Characteristics of Illegal Aliens 
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SOURCE: Jeffrey S. Passel and Karen A. Woodrow "Geographic Distribution of Undocu 
mented Immigrants: Estimates of Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 Census by 
State," International Migration Review. Vol 18 (3), Fall 1984, pp. 642-671.
NOTE: — designates the data not reported in the source.
a. With the exception of the sex ratio, for each category the sum of the entries totals to 100 
percent, except for rounding.
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abolished the pernicious "national origins" quota system. The 
national origins quota system had been instituted in the 1920s to 
severely restrict eastern and southern European immigration. Asian 
immigration, which had been limited by late 19th and early 20th 
century legislation and administrative action, had been barred in 
the 1917 immigration law. The 1965 Amendments also reduced the 
emphasis, introduced in the 1952 legislation, on skill or occupation 
for rationing visas among applicants from within a country.
The 1965 Amendments introduced numerical limits on Western 
Hemispheric immigration. It also introduced a system of "prefer 
ences" with a heavy emphasis on kinship with a U.S. citizen or 
resident alien as the rationing mechanism. Skill and refugee status 
were given relatively minor roles.
The basic features of current immigration law, including the 
changes introduced by the Refugee Act of 1980 and other amend 
ments, are outlined in table 2-4. The number of immigrants 
"admitted" to the United States under various categories is shown 
in table 2-5 for 1984. The worldwide, country and preference 
category quotas indicated in table 2-4 refer to ceilings on the 
number of visas issued in a year. The data on immigration refer to 
the number of persons entering the United States with an immigrant 
visa or receiving a change in status to permanent resident alien. 
Immigrant visas need not be used in the fiscal year they are issued, 
and some are never used.
A person can receive immigrant status (permanent resident alien 
status) under one of four general categories—as an immediate 
relative of a U.S. citizen, by other kinship criteria, by occupation 
(skill), and through refugee status. In addition, refugees can be 
given asylum or parole status by the U.S. Attorney General, which 
enables them to enter and work in the United States indefinitely, 
although most eventually obtain an adjustment of status and 
become permanent resident aliens.
The immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, that is, the spouse, 
unmarried minor children, and parents of adult citizens, can enter
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Table 2-4
Summary of the Immigration Law Under the
1965 Amendments to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act and Subsequent Amendments
Immigrants not subject to numerical limitation
A. Spouse and minor children of U.S. citizens and the parents of U.S.
citizens over age 21 
B. Refugees and Asylees (Since the Refugee Act of 1980)
Immigrants subject to numerical limitation in the preference system
Quotas (visas per year) 
1965-1978 1978-1980 1981-present 
Eastern Hemisphere* 170,000 j
Western Hemisphere51 120,000^ ^","w z/u,uuu 









Unmarried adult children 
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Spouse and unmarried 
children of permanent 
resident aliens
Professionals, scientists, 
and artists of exceptional 
ability
Married children of U.S. 
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Siblings of U.S. citizens
Workers in occupations 
for which labor is scarce 
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20 percent
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10 percent plus any not 
required for first three 
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Seventh6 Refugees6 6 percent6
Nonpre- Any applicant not entitled Numbers not required for 
ferencef to a preference preference applicants
Spouse and minor Charged to appropriate 
children of any preference preference 
applicant can be classified 
with the same preference 
if a visa is not otherwise 
________ available __ __ __ ___ ___ _____
SOURCE: Immigration and Naturalization Service.
a. The hemisphere quotas were converted to a combined world ceiling of 290,000 visas by the
1978 Amendments and reduced to 270,000 visas per year when the Refugee Act of 1980
removed refugees from the preference system.
b. Country Ceiling applicable to the Eastern Hemisphere under the 1965 Amendments and 
the Western Hemisphere since the 1977 amendments.
c. Preference system applicable to the Eastern Hemisphere under the 1965 Amendments and 
the Western Hemisphere under the 1977 Amendments. Prior to 1977, Western Hemisphere 
visas issued on a first-come, first-served basis. Within the country ceiling, colonies or 
dependencies had a ceiling of 600 visas, which was raised to 5,000 visas in the 1986 
amendments.
d. Increased from 20 percent of 290,000 visas to 26 percent of the 270,000 visas with the 
passage of the Refugee Act of 1980.
e. The Refugee Act of 1980 established a temporary annual quota of 50,000 visas for refugees 
outside of the preference system and gave the President authority to admit additional 
refugees and to admit refugees indefinitely after the expiration of the temporary 
provisions. The refugee quota is now set annually. The 1980 Act changed the definitions 
of "refugee" to a person with a well-founded fear of religious, political, or racial 
persecution regardless of country or origin, whereas refugee status was previously 
applicable only to persons fleeing a Communist country or the general area of the Middle 
East.
f. Nonpreference applicants have to obtain a labor certificate (i.e. demonstrate they have a 
"needed" skill and a job waiting for them), invest money in a business in the U.S., or 
satisfy some other criterion to demonstrate their economic value to the U.S. immigration 
of the spouses and children of U.S. citizens and only secondarily because of the increased 
immigration of parents.
the United States without numerical limitation. Although the 
number of persons entering the United States in this manner had 
fluctuated around 100,000 annually in the decade after 1965, it 
increased to over 150,000 annually in 1980, and is now approxi-
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Table 2-5 
Immigrants Admitted to the U.S. by Class of Admission, 1984a
Category
Exempt from numerical limit
Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens
Refugee and asylee adjustments
Otherb
Subject to limit (preferences system)
First (unmarried children of U.S. citizens)
Second (spouses and unmarried children of 
resident aliens)
Third (professionals or highly skilled workers)0
Fourth (married children of U.S. citizens)
Fifth (siblings of U.S. citizens)


































SOURCE: U.S. Department of Justice, 1984 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986, Table IMM 1.5, 
p. 11-14.
a. Spouses and children of visa recipients included in totals.
b. Includes ministers (1,540), spouses of U.S. citizens who entered as fiance(e)s (5,464), 
children born abroad to resident aliens (3,639) and other special categories.
c. Includes 10,691 third preference and 11,393 sixth preference "principals" (i.e., recipients of 
labor certifications). The remainder are spouses and children.
mately 200,000 per year. This has been largely due to the increased 
immigration of the spouses and children of U.S. citizens and only 
secondarily because of the increased immigration of parents.
Western Hemisphere immigrant visas subject to numerical Limit 
had been rationed on a first-come first-served basis under the 1965 
Amendments. Legislation enacted in 1977 brought them under the 
same rationing system as the Eastern Hemisphere. This rationing 
system is largely based on kinship. Currently 80 percent of the
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annual number of 270,00 numerically limited visas are reserved for 
the adult children (first and fourth preferences) and siblings (fifth 
preference) of U.S. citizens, and the spouse and unmarried children 
of permanent resident aliens (second preference). The spouse and 
minor children of any person receiving a visa can generally receive 
a visa in the same preference category if a visa is not otherwise 
available for them.
The two remaining preferences, the third and sixth, are for 
persons who can demonstrate a U.S. labor market "need" for their 
services. The third preference is for professionals of exceptional 
ability (professors, scientists, artists, etc.), while the sixth is for 
skilled workers in occupations with a scarce U.S. labor supply (e.g., 
chefs). A labor certificate, issued by the Office of Labor Certifica 
tion in the U.S. Department of Labor, is a prerequisite for an 
occupational preference visa. To obtain a labor certificate a U.S. 
employer must petition on behalf of the visa applicant and demon 
strate that no appropriate worker can be found in the U.S. at the 
"prevailing wage." Although it would seem that 20 percent of the 
preference visa applicants are to some extent "skill" tested, more 
than half of the 3rd and 5th preference visa recipients are the 
spouses and minor children of labor certification recipients (see 
table 2-5).
Of the more than 540,000 immigrants "admitted" to the U.S. in 
1984, about 345,000 were new arrivals and nearly 200,000 received 
an adjustment of their status to that of an immigrant (primarily, 
refugees and relatives of U.S. citizens). Nearly two-thirds of the 
immigrants were admitted under kinship criteria, one-quarter under 
refugee criteria, and less than 10 percent under the occupational 
preferences (of whom half are the relatives of occupational prefer 
ence principals).
Current law includes a country limit of 20, 000 visas per year, but 
only for visas subject to numerical limit. 5 While there are some 
slight differences between country of birth and country of "charge- 
ability" under immigration law, they are largely one and the same.
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The countries for which this ceiling tends to be most binding include 
China, India, Korea, the Philippines and Mexico. Immigration 
from these countries can be substantially in excess of the 20,000 
level as a result of the absence of a limit on the immediate relatives 
of U.S. citizens. Among 1984 immigrants born in Mexico, for 
example, about one-third were subject to the ceiling (19,576), while 
nearly two-thirds were exempt, largely because they were the 
immediate relatives of U.S. citizens (table 2-6). Only one-tenth of 1 
percent of Mexican immigrants were "skill tested" as occupational 
preference principals.
Table 2-6 
Immigrants Born in Mexico Admitted to the U.S. by Category, 1984
Category
Exempt from numerical limit
Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens3
Children born aboard to resident aliens
Other
Subject to limit (preferences)
Relative preferences
Occupational preferences — principals

























SOURCE: U.S. Department of Justice, 1984 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986, Tables IMM 
2.3, IMM 2.6, IMM 3.1.
a. Parents, spouses, fiances and children of U.S. citizens.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 did not 
introduce any major changes in the provisions for obtaining a 
permanent resident alien visa ("green card"), except for amnesty for 
illegal ah'ens and a new "replenishment agricultural worker" 
(RAW) program, (U.S. House of Representatives, 1986). 6 Under 
the 1986 Act, amnesty is generally to be granted to illegal aliens who 
have been in the U.S. "continuously" since before January 1, 1982. 
A twelve-month application period for the "temporary resident
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alien status" began in May 1987. After 18 months in this status, the 
aliens must apply for permanent resident alien status within a 
12-month period or else lapse into an illegal status. Granting 
permanent resident alien status will be virtually automatic for the 
legalized aliens who apply and have some minimal understanding of 
English.
Different provisions apply for "special agricultural workers" 
(SAWs), that is, illegal aliens who have worked in perishable-crop 
agriculture in the U.S. for at least 90 days during the 12-month 
period ending May 1, 1986. They may apply for temporary resident 
alien status. Their period in the temporary resident alien category 
ranges from 12 to 24 months, varying inversely with the number of 
seasons they have worked in the U.S. seasonal agriculture.
The 1986 Act includes a ceiling of 350,000 permanent resident 
alien visas that may be granted under the agricultural worker 
program (SAW). Otherwise, there are no country or worldwide 
ceilings on the number of aliens eligible for amnesty, and legalized 
aliens are not counted against country or worldwide ceilings. Upon 
receipt of permanent resident alien status, those receiving amnesty 
may serve as immigration sponsors for relatives who are not already 
in the U.S.
The 1986 Act also provides for a three-year "replenishment 
agricultural worker" (RAW) program starting in fiscal year 1990, 
when the SAW temporary resident alien period comes to an end. To 
be activated, the Secretaries of Labor and Agriculture must deter 
mine that there is a "shortage" of workers who are qualified and 
available for seasonal farm work. Persons receiving temporary 
worker status under the RAW provision must work in perishable 
agriculture for at least 90 days in each of three consecutive years 
before becoming permanent resident aliens. After becoming perma 
nent resident aliens, they must also work for at least five seasons in 
agriculture to be eligible for naturalization. Previous temporary 
farm workers programs, such as the bracero program (1942 to 1964)
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and the current H-2 program, have not provided opportunities for 
obtaining a permanent resident alien visa.
Although amnesty and the RAW program are one-time events 
under the provisions of the 1986 Act, it is reasonable to assume that 
as illegal immigration continues, they will become recurring events. 
In general, the 1986 Act is much more generous in providing labor 
for seasonal farm work than for other sectors of the economy.
The binding nature of U.S. immigration law means that only a 
subset of persons who would like to immigrate can do so readily. 
Obtaining a visa is easier if a potential applicant has relatives 
already in the U.S., and the ease is greater the more immediate the 
relationship and if the relative is a citizen. Obtaining a visa is more 
difficult if a larger number of nationals from one's country of origin 
also seek a visa and if a refugee status cannot be claimed.
The combined effects of large demand for immigrant visas from 
many countries of origin and a limited supply of visas result in a 
large pool of actual and potential unsuccessful visa applicants. The 
size of the pool cannot be measured directly. It is surely larger than 
the sum of the number of individuals who are in the visa "backlog" 
(or queue) waiting their turn and the number who have been denied 
a visa. Many individuals who wish to immigrate but who know they 
cannot qualify for a visa under current law would not even apply.
///. Incentives for Illegal Migration
As indicated above, there are three selection criteria relevant for 
determining who will be an illegal alien: the decision to migrate; the 
inability to obtain a lawful visa; and the decision to migrate in 
violation of the law.
Immigrants can be classified in several major categories. Eco 
nomic migrants are those who move primarily on the basis of their 
estimate of their earning potential in the destination compared to 
that in the origin. For economic migrants, immigration can be 
viewed in terms of a human capital investment. A human capital
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investment is an expenditure of time and other resources that raises 
the labor market productivity embodied in a person. Although 
usually thought of in terms of schooling and on-the-job training, the 
definition applies equally well to migration. A change in the 
person's locale is clearly embodied in the person, and for economic 
migrants the primary objective is the greater real income from 
moving from where their skills are less well rewarded to where they 
are more highly rewarded.
Economic migrants tend to be unmarried young adults. With an 
increase in labor market experience in the origin there is an increase 
in skills that are useful in the origin, but which may have little 
transferability to a destination. This raises the cost of migrating (the 
value of the lost earnings during the migration process), as well as 
reduces the earnings differential between the origin and destination. 
There is also "location-specific" capital not directly related to the 
labor market. This includes information about and an attachment 
to the place of origin, including family and friends in the origin. The 
greater these attachments, the greater the cost of moving. Further 
more, a nonworking spouse and young children raise the cost of 
migrating without impacting on the benefit side of the scale.
Immigrants, and migrants in general, seem to have another 
characteristic that is not as easy to quantify. Immigrants are 
sometimes described as "favorably self-selected." That is, they are 
more able, ambitious, risk-taking and/or entrepreneurial individu 
als than those who remain in the origin. These characteristics are 
not surprising, they are the very characteristics that are likely to be 
associated with greater economic benefits in the higher income 
destination.7
Migrating across international borders involves much more than 
just the initial move. Most important is the adaptation to the new 
environment. Individuals who are more flexible and those who are 
better decisionmakers will be more successful immigrants. Hence 
economic migrants can be expected to have more "allocative skills," 
that is skills in making decisions by acquiring and combining 
diverse pieces of information.8
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Tied movers are individuals whose migration decision is largely 
based on the migration behavior of another family member—a 
spouse, parent, child or sibling. Because their own economic 
incentives are less central, they are less likely to have the unique 
economic migrant profile—unmarried young adult with transfer 
able skills and favorably self-selected, or labor market success.
Refugees are individuals who leave their origin not primarily for 
labor market reasons but because of actual or anticipated persecu 
tion on the basis of their political ideology, class origin, race, 
religion, or merely having joined the "wrong" side in a civil war or 
revolution. Refugees, as with tied movers, would also demonstrate 
a lesser intensity in the selective characteristics expected of eco 
nomic migrants. Refugees, for example, include many older adults 
rather than being primarily young adults. They include workers 
with skills acquired in school or on the job that are not readily 
transferable internationally—lawyers, politician, and generals—as 
well as those with more highly transferable skills—physician, 
scientists.
Motives for migrating are complex and although it may be 
tempting to classify international migrants as economic migrants, 
tied movers, or refugees, more than one factor may be responsible 
for the migration decision. A person's "economic move" may be 
encouraged by being reunited with a sibling; a member of a 
persecuted minority may leave in part because employment oppor 
tunities are better elsewhere.
Regardless of the person's motive for migrating, a potential 
immigrant will seek the visa that is "cheapest" to obtain. A refugee 
who may not qualify for a refugee visa may seek an occupational 
preference visa (e.g., some Chilean professionals). Some economic 
migrants may be able to obtain refugee visas (e.g., some Polish 
Solidarity members). And, potential economic migrants have mar 
ried U.S. citizen to obtain a kinship visa.
In practice, the second selection filter, the visa selection process, 
focuses on those who can satisfy kinship and refugee criteria.
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Generally, over 95 percent of immigrants received kinship or 
refugee visas. In addition, even if a person cannot immigrate under 
one of the kinship categories, having a relative or friend in the U.S. 
can be of considerable value in identifying an employer willing and 
able to help the applicant obtain an occupational preference visa. 
Thus, the immigration visa rationing system is largely neutral with 
respect to the skill characteristics of applicants.
The third selective filter which is relevant for unsuccessful visa 
applicants is whether to become an illegal alien. Illegal immigration 
may be relatively less costly for immigrants from some countries 
than others. For a Mexican illegal alien apprehended at the border 
and who accepts a voluntary departure, the cost of another 
attempted illegal entry the next night may be small. For a Korean 
visa abuser (e.g.,violating a student or tourist visa) the cost of 
another entry includes the difficulty of obtaining a visa as well as the 
expensive airfare. The greater are the relative costs of illegal 
immigration from a country, the smaller will be the proportion of 
unsuccessful visa applicants who will seek to become illegal 
migrants.9
The different incentives for illegal migration have an effect on the 
relative skill characteristics of those who actually become illegal 
aliens. There is a nontrivial probability of apprehension and 
deportation even after having illegally but successfully penetrated 
the U.S. border. Furthermore, the probability of detection and the 
costs of deportation are greater if the illegal alien workers are 
accompanied by dependent family members. This provides an 
incentive to leave dependents in the country of origin, but it also 
increases the temporary or cyclical nature of their migration to the 
U.S. Illegal aliens are more likely than legal immigrants to make 
investment decisions characteristic of temporary workers. Illegal 
aliens who make large investments that are specific to the U. S. 
labor market—whether these investments are occupational, geo 
graphic, or firm-specific suffer a greater loss if they are apprehended 
and deported or simply voluntarily leave the U.S. than otherwise 
similar illegal aliens with perfectly internationally transferable skills
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or with very few skills. In addition, skills specific to the country of 
origin will have depreciated while in the U.S. An illegal alien who 
returns to the country of origin voluntarily or involuntarily would 
be at a disadvantage if his skills had depreciated. Furthermore, 
there is a tendency for the dollar value of country-specific skills to 
rise with the level of skill, even if it shrinks as a proportion of total 
skills. For the migration decision, however, it is the dollar value of 
country-specific skills that plays the central role, not the share. 
Thus, among unsuccessful visa applicants, the existence of country- 
specific skills reduces incentives for illegal migration, resulting in the 
incentives being greatest for those with few if any skills.
Documentation, credentials or licenses are much more likely to 
be required for jobs that require skill, such as craft or professional 
occupations, than for many low-skilled jobs. The demonstration of, 
or application for, the appropriate documentation, credential or 
license may reveal an illegal alien's presence. That is, an illegal alien 
is more likely to be detected if he/she applies for a medical, nursing, 
plumbing or barbering license than if the alien works in a restaurant 
or nonunion factory job. This documentation effect also implies 
that incentives for illegal immigration are greater for workers with 
few skills.
These considerations have implications for the demographic 
characteristics and skill level of illegal aliens. Illegal aliens are likely 
to be young adults, either male or female, coming to the U.S. 
without dependent family members. Although economic migrations 
tend to be favorably self-selected on the bases of their skill or 
ability, this is less intense for illegal aliens, and there may even be 
negative selectivity by skill level. Illegal aliens will tend to have 
either internationally transferable skills or have few if any skills. 
The skills of illegal aliens will be lower than those of legal 
immigrants from the same country of origin, and the relative gap 
will be greater the higher the skill level of the legal immigrants. Yet, 
the illegal immigrants will tend to be high-ability, motivated, 
ambitious, entrepreneurial individuals when compared with other 
low-skill workers who choose to remain in the origin (Cross and
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Sandos, 1981). As they live and work in the U.S., as their U.S. roots 
deepen, and as they become more permanently attached to the U.S. 
labor market, the illegal aliens acquire skills specific to their 
employer, their industry and the U.S. as a whole. As these skills 
improve, job changes take place and their earnings and employment
opportunities expand.
NOTES
1 A similar picture emerges for the nearly 300 non-Mexican illegal aliens who 
responded to these questions. Twelve percent did not have running water and 10 
percent did not have electricity in their country of origin, but all had both in the 
U.S. Of those who had a TV or radio in their home country, most (92 percent) 
had one or more in the U.S. Of those who did not have a TV or radio in their 
country of origin, 70 percent had one or more in the U.S.
2 The cost of interior enforcement has been increased by court decisions limiting 
INS freedom of action in employer "raids" and other activities.
3 For example, suppose one estimate of the population without illegal aliens is 222 
million plus or minus one million, and the other independent estimate which 
includes illegal aliens is 225 million, also plus or minus one million. The mean 
difference is 3 million, but the lower and upper bounds are 1 to 5 million. 
Although the separate estimates of the population have relatively little error (less 
than one-half of 1 percent in either direction), the difference is subject to a 
relatively large error (67 percent in either direction).
4 This is a longer duration of residence than is reported for apprehended illegal 
aliens, even those who have been in the U.S. for at least one month during their 
most recent entry. In part, the greater length of stay in the census estimate may 
reflect the period since they first came to the U.S. to stay (the Census question) 
rather than the period of time they have been in an illegal status during their 
most recent stay (the INS question).
Deportable aliens located in 1984 by length of time illegally in the U.S. 
(excluding certain crewmen):
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SOURCE: 1984 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (1986) 
Table ENF 1.4, p. 194.
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5 Within the country limit, colonies and dependencies had a ceiling of 600 visas, which was 
raised to 5,000 visas in the 1986 Immigration Act.
6 Enforcement of immigration law in the agricultural sector was made more difficult under 
the 1986 Act by requiring for the first time search warrants for INS activities on the open 
areas of farms.
7 It is easy to show that those with higher levels of ability generally have a greater incentive 
than those of lesser ability to migrate from a low to a higher income area. 
Let Wjj be earnings, where i=0 in the origin, i = d in the destination, j = h for high-ability 
workers, and j = u for low-ability workers. The equation 
Cj=pW0: + D represents the total cost of migration, where p is the proportion of the year 
devoted to migration and D is the out-of-pocket cost (e.g., airline or bus tickets, cost of 
moving or acquiring household goods, etc.).
Suppose high-ability workers earn 100k percent more than low-ability workers in both the 
origin and the destination. Then using the simple formula for the rate of return on an 
investment that assumes costs occur in the initial period and there is a very long life,
wdu -w
ru =pWou + D
is the rate of return from migration for the low-ability person. For the high-ability person,
Wdh - Woh = (l + k)(Wdu -Wou) = Wdu - Wou_______ 
rh = pWoh + D (1 + k)pWou + D pWou + D/(l + k).
Under the conditions specified, rh > ru as long as D > 0. The difference between rh and ru 
is smaller the lower is D relative to Wou and p. This argument is strengthened if those with 
greater labor market ability are also more efficient in migration, that is, they have a lower p 
or D.
Thus in this simple model those in the origin with greater ability have a greater economic 
incentive to migrate. The degree of favorable selectivity is smaller if the cost of migrating 
between the two countries is smaller.
8 For an analysis of the implications of the distinction between "allocative efficiency" 
(decisionmaking) and "worker efficiency" (following directions) see T. W. Schultz (1975).
9 Conceptually, the number of "unsuccessful visa applicants" should include all persons who 
would apply if a visa were readily available but who do not apply because of the low 
probability of qualifying under current regulations. These discouraged applicants can be 
expected to be far more numerous than those who apply and are denied a visa. They are 




In recent years there has been a great public policy interest in 
illegal aliens. In nearly every session of Congress for the past decade 
one House or the other has considered legislation, and in 1986 the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act granted amnesty for certain 
illegal aliens and imposed sanctions on employers of illegal aliens. 
Although there have been several commissions and task forces, the 
advancement in knowledge about illegal aliens and their labor 
market activities has been remarkably small. 1
What is perhaps most unique about the public policy debate 
regarding illegal aliens is the relative absence of systematic social 
science research. It has not been possible to estimate with precision 
the size of the illegal alien population or to measure the character 
istics of this population. The reason is that illegal aliens have an 
obvious incentive to avoid contact with survey or census interview 
ers and, if interviewed, to avoid revealing their status. In the 
absence of a data base, competing hypotheses regarding the size, 
characteristics and impact of the illegal alien population can persist. 
Their persistence may be responsible for the difficulty in developing 
a consensus in the public policy debate and in Congress, and for the 
widespread dissatisfaction with the provisions that finally did get 
enacted.
This chapter reports on the survey methodology developed and 
implemented for the study of the illegal alien labor market. The 
survey is the basis for most of the analysis in the substantive 
chapters that follow. It is a methodology that can have general 
applicability for the study of the illegal alien labor market, and can
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be used for the study of other issues. Section I discusses why illegal 
aliens and their employers are so difficult to study. Section II 
discusses the methodology used to survey a random sample of 
apprehended illegal aliens and their employers. The success of the 
methodology is analyzed in Section III. Section IV is a summary 
and conclusion.
/. Survey Research on Illegal Aliens
The large increase in public concern with illegal immigration in 
the past decade can be related to the perception that the number of 
illegal aliens has increased manyfold. It is, however, not merely the 
number of illegal aliens that is relevant for understanding their 
impact on the U.S. The economic and social impact of illegal aliens 
depends in part on the alien's characteristics. For example, consider 
two polar examples. The impact of an unskilled illegal alien 
population locked into dead-end jobs, who move freely and fre 
quently between the U.S. and their home country, would be very 
different from that of a skilled, upwardly mobile illegal alien 
population that is permanently settled in this country.
There are many unanswered questions regarding illegal aliens. 
Are illegal aliens in jobs that are so undesirable that native workers 
would not take them and hence there is no direct competition in the 
labor market between illegal aliens and individuals with legal rights 
to employment? At another extreme, is there such direct competi 
tion in the labor market between illegal and legal workers that 
illegal aliens depress wage and employment opportunities for legal 
workers with comparable skills? Are illegal aliens in low-wage, 
dead-end, nonunion jobs with little opportunity for on-the-job 
training or, given their initial skill level, are they in jobs that provide 
high wages and training opportunities? Are the employers of illegal 
aliens small, nonunionized, ethnic enclave employers? Out of a fear 
of deportation, are illegal aliens held by their employers in a virtual 
bondage that is little different from slavery? Or do illegal aliens 
experience considerable voluntary job mobility, working for em-
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ployers little different from employers in the same region and 
industry that do not hire illegal workers?
These questions about the employment of illegal aliens cannot be 
answered merely by analytical reasoning. They are essentially 
empirical issues. One approach would be to do a survey of 
employers and to ask them about their employment of illegal aliens, 
as well as the characteristics of the workplace. This approach, 
however, would suffer from two major problems. One is that 
employers might not cooperate in a survey that asked direct 
questions about illegal alien employment. Until the 1986 Immigra 
tion Reform and Control Act which took effect in 1987, it was not 
against federal law to knowingly employ an illegal alien, and in the 
few states in which employer sanctions were on the books, the law 
was not enforced. Yet, many employers, including those who 
employ illegal aliens, may have been under the false impression that 
it was illegal (Chiswick and Fullam, 1980). Even if they knew it was 
not illegal, employers who consider it a "socially undesirable" 
practice, or who believe others hold this view, might be reluctant to 
respond truthfully. Similarly, employers skeptical of promises of 
confidentiality might have been reluctant to respond truthfully out 
of fear of an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) raid.
The second problem with direct inquiries is that employers may 
not know the legal status of individual workers. When there was no 
legal requirement to identify an applicant's legal right to work in 
this country, employers would not wish to incur the expenses of 
obtaining this knowledge, particularly since direct responses by job 
applicants may be false. As a result of the new legislation, employers 
now have to be shown documents (e.g., a passport, birth certificate, 
or driver's license), but they are not required to ascertain the 
authenticity of these documents. Perhaps most important, employer 
perceptions of the legal status of their workers may be quite 
different from the reality.
A direct survey of illegal aliens themselves would be equally 
trouble-prone. There is no unbiased sampling frame for illegal
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aliens. Illegal aliens have an incentive to be nonrespondents in a 
survey or census for fear of inadvertently revealing their status. 
Without administrative record checks, even indirect questions on 
legal status are not likely to generate accurate responses. Some 
studies use "community contacts" to identify, gain cooperation 
from and interview illegal aliens. There are numerous biases 
inherent in this type of haphazard sampling. Different types of 
illegal aliens may be identified depending on the type of contact. 
For example, women may predominate if the contact is churches; 
intact working families with a long stable residence in the U.S. may 
predominate if the contact is a community group that helps aliens 
obtain an "adjustment of status"; young males may predominate if 
the contact is through street corners, bars or pool halls.
Moreover, the types of research questions relevant for a study of 
illegal aliens and the labor market require microdata on both the 
illegal alien and the alien's employer. Most workers, regardless of 
their legal status, would not be able to provide information about 
many employer and workplace characteristics that are relevant for 
analytical purposes. The workers would generally not be aware of 
the type of business organization, the size of the establishment, and 
the number, schooling, job training and demographic characteristic 
of the establishment's workforce, among other characteristics. This 
is more likely to be the situation for relatively new non-English 
speaking workers who have little familiarity with the U.S. labor 
market.
//. The Survey Methodology
This section discusses the survey methodology and some of the 
limitations of the application of the methodology.2
(a) Procedures
Whenever an illegal alien is apprehended by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), a form is completed called a Record
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of Deportable Alien, better known by its form number 1-213 (see 
Exhibit 1). The 1-213 is an administrative record kept in the local 
INS office, although summary statistics are transmitted to INS 
headquarters in Washington, D.C. for management purposes and 
publication in the INS Annual Report and Statistical Yearbook.
The 1-213 includes information on the name and address of the 
alien, as well as on the alien's demographic characteristics (such as 
date of birth, sex, marital status, number of children). It also 
includes questions on immigration characteristics, such as when and 
where the alien last entered the U.S., immigrant status at entry, 
method of location of the alien, country of last permanent resi 
dence, and nationality, as well as the nationality of the alien's 
spouse, parents and children. The labor market information in 
cludes the name and address of the current or most recent employer 
in the U.S., the period of employment, and the wage rate. The 1-213 
forms filed in the interior, as distinct from the border area, are 
nearly always completed in full, although the degree of truthfulness 
of the responses is open to question. The information on the 1-213 
regarding the current or most recent employer permits these forms 
to be used as a sampling frame for a survey of the employers of 
apprehended illegal aliens.
Results from a survey of employers of illegal aliens cannot be 
interpreted in isolation. The distinguishing characteristics of their 
employers can be determined only by knowing how employers that 
either do not employ illegal aliens or who are randomly selected 
from the population of employers respond to the same questions. It 
is not possible to develop a sample of employers who do not employ 
illegal aliens. Indeed, even an employer cannot be certain that there 
are no illegal aliens in the workforce. On the other hand, randomly 
selected employers from lists of establishments can be used as a 
benchmark if it is assumed that not all employers hire illegal aliens, 
or that the proportion of illegal aliens in the workforce is larger 
among those establishments identified by an illegal alien.
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Thus, the survey methodology adopted for this project was to 
draw a stratified random sample of 1-213 forms filed in an INS 
District Office (interior) and to transcribe on an "abstract form" the 
relevant demographic, immigrant and labor market data, including 
the identity of the alien's employer. The employers identified in this 
manner are referred to as the "INS sample." A "general sample" of 
employers is identified by drawing a random sample from standard 
lists or directories of establishments in the same geographic area.
The methodology was implemented for the Chicago SMSA using 
the 1-213 forms filed in the Chicago District Office of INS during 
1983. A pilot study (Chiswick and Fullam, 1980) indicated that 
greater statistical efficiency could be achieved for the same budget 
by using stratified sampling for the 1-213 forms. Three industry 
categories (manufacturing, restaurant and other services) and two 
country-of-origin categories (Mexican and non-Mexican) resulted 
in six cells. The stratification was done because of the greater 
homogeneity of some of the key study variables in the restaurant 
sector and the overwhelming number of 1-213 forms for Mexican 
nationals in the INS Chicago files. For each month in 1983, the 
1-213 forms for male illegal aliens with an "identifiable" employer 
were separated into the six strata and systematic sampling was 
employed. 3 For employers identified by more than one sampled 
alien, random sampling was used to select only one identifying 
alien.
The general sample of employers was developed by systematic 
random sampling of directories within each of the three industries. 
The sources for establishments in the Chicago SMSA were the 
Illinois Manufacturers Directory (1984), the Illinois Services Direc 
tory (1984), and restaurant listings in the 1984 Yellow Pages 
telephone directories for the Chicago SMSA.
A double-blind interviewing procedure was used so that the 
interviewers and respondents would not be influenced by knowing 
the specific source for the name and address of the establishment. 
The interviewers were told that the purpose of the study was to
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learn about the hiring needs and practices of employers in different 
types of industries, and that the employers had been randomly 
selected from various directories and listings for the Chicago 
metropolitan area. The specific directories and listings were not 
mentioned and at no time were the interviewers informed that a 
portion of the sample had been taken from INS records. The 
establishments were provided the same information as the inter 
viewers regarding the nature of the study and the source of the 
sample cases.
The questionnaire was designed to obtain a wide range of data 
regarding the characteristics of the establishment and the workforce 
(see Exhibit 2). The survey instrument began with general questions 
regarding ownership, number of employees, their racial and ethnic 
composition, schooling level, provision of on-the-job training, 
unionization and wage rates, among other variables. A set of 
questions on new hires, number employed, and reasons for termi 
nations were then asked regarding several demographic groups 
—young workers, older workers, adult males, adult females and 
"recent immigrants." Recent immigrants were defined as individu 
als in the U.S. less than five years. There were no direct questions 
about the hiring or employment of illegal aliens.
The interviews were to be conducted with the person at the 
establishment who was in charge of hiring for the most typical male 
nonsupervisory job. The interviewers were instructed to seek a 
face-to-face interview.4 If the respondent seemed hesitant, the 
interviewer was to offer the respondent a summary of the survey 
findings. 5 A second procedure to avoid a refusal was to offer to 
conduct the interview by telephone if the interviewer thought that a 
telephone interview was feasible. Last, a monetary incentive of $15 
for the estabhshment could be offered as a token compensation for 
the respondent's time. Interviewers were instructed to offer the 
stipend only after having exhausted all other alternatives for gaining 
cooperation and only when the respondent indicated he or she was 
"too busy to spare the time," "could not waste company time" or 
gave similar reasons for refusing to be interviewed. To discourage
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interviewers from offering the stipend too readily and because of the 
potentially high cost of such an open-ended offer, the interviewers 
knew in advance that each had a maximum limit of six stipends that 
could be given.
(b) Limitations
One limitation of the sampling methodology is that INS appre 
hensions at the Chicago District Office are not likely to constitute a 
random sample of the resident illegal alien population in the 
Chicago metropolitan area. Illegal aliens who have less experience 
or who are less adept at avoiding detection are more likely to be 
apprehended. In addition, at various times the INS has targeted its 
limited enforcement resources on particular segments of the illegal 
alien population.
There was apparently no particular targeting emphasis in effect at 
the Chicago District Office during 1983. Furthermore, the aliens 
were brought to the INS's attention through a variety of mecha 
nisms, including INS-initiated establishment raids, "referrals" from 
the police arising mainly from traffic violations, brawls and petty 
crime, "snitching" by former lovers, jealous co-workers and angry 
neighbors, as well as "walk-ins," those who turn themselves in to 
the INS because they believe they could qualify for legal status. The 
greater the variety in methods of location of illegal aliens, the more 
closely the apprehensions may approximate a random sample of the 
resident illegal alien population.
Another limitation of the methodology is the different nature of 
the probability of inclusion in the two employer samples. Employ 
ers of illegal aliens are more likely to be in the INS sample the 
greater the proportion of illegal aliens among their workers and the 
larger the number of workers. The probability of inclusion in the 
general sample is largely independent of the number of workers. 
While this difference affects the average size of the establishments in 
the two samples, it should not affect other comparisons when 
establishment size is held constant.
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///. Evaluation of the Survey Methodology
The survey methodology is evaluated in this section to determine 
the effectiveness of the procedures, and to offer insights that would 
be useful for future employer surveys, particularly on potentially 
sensitive topics.
(a) Eligible Establishments
The INS Record of Deportable Alien (1-213) was used to identify 
establishments known to have employed an apprehended illegal 
ah'en. The probability that an establishment is in this sample is 
directly related to the proportion of illegal aliens in its workforce 
and the number of employees. Both factors are relevant if the 
probability of an illegal alien being apprehended is purely random, 
but they are even more important if INS targets its enforcement 
activities towards establishments believed to be employing a larger 
number of illegal aliens.
The general samples of employers were randomly selected from 
industry-based directories of establishments. For these establish 
ments, the probability of being sampled is independent of the 
number of employees, except to the extent that size may influence 
inclusion in the directory listing.
Thus, the two sampling frames offer different probabilities of 
selection as a function of the establishment's size. This influenced 
the proportion of sample cases classified as ineligible because they 
had five or fewer employees. In the INS sample, 19 establishments 
out of the 292 sample cases (6.5 percent) were identified as having 
five or fewer employees, in contrast with the 67 establishments out 
of 371 sample cases (18.1 percent) in the general sample. This same 
phenomenon undoubtedly influenced the finding that the average 
number of employees in the INS sample exceeds that in the general 
sample.
The general sample also included a larger proportion of cases 
where, in spite of a name and address, it was not possible to locate
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the establishment. This may have arisen because of the greater 
proportion of smaller firms, some of which may have closed or 
moved without leaving an easily obtained forwarding address. In 
addition, the "current" directory listings were older than the INS 
arrest records, and may therefore have contained more errors.
(b) Locating the INS Sample of Establishments in Directories
The INS sample included only employers for whom sufficient 
information was provided by the alien so that the employer might 
reasonably be located. Through telephone listings and interviewer 
visits to the address, it was possible to locate nearly all of the 
employers. Yet, for various reasons, relying on telephone listings 
alone would have proved inadequate. It was not possible to locate 
in telephone directories a surprising 31.2 percent of the establish 
ments. Nearly all of the restaurants were identified in phone 
directories (only 1 percent were not identified), but 29 percent of the 
manufacturing establishments and a surprising 61 percent of the 
"other service" establishments could not be located in telephone 
directories. Within industry categories, there was no significant 
difference between establishments identified by a Mexican or a 
non-Mexican illegal alien in the proportion located in phone 
directories.
In some instances the respondent may have provided a different 
company name than is used in the phone listing. In service 
industries, such as lawn care, the establishment's "location" may be 
ambiguous and hence the greater difficulty in locating the establish 
ment.
These findings suggest potential difficulties in using phone direc 
tories as a sampling frame for employer surveys in manufacturing 
and especially in service industries other than restaurants. They also 
suggest the difficulty of trying to computer-match establishments 
identified from two separate sources based on surveys or adminis-
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trative records. Supplementing telephone listings with interviewer 
visits was responsible for the final high match rate.
(c) Interview Completion Rates
Among the 497 establishments deemed eligible for an interview 
and for whom interview attempts were made, 76 were classified as 
refusals and 421 were actually interviewed. This is an interview rate 
of 84.7 percent overall, 84.0 percent in the INS sample and 85.4 
percent in the general (directory) sample. No interviews were 
terminated before the final questions.
Of the 421 interviews, 15 were classified as "partial interviews" 
because of the large amount of missing data.6 Excluding partial 
interviews, the "completion rate," defined as complete interviews 
(406) divided by total interviews and refusals (497), was 81.7 percent 
(table 3-1). The rate is 79.4 percent in the INS sample and 83.9 
percent in the general sample.
The completion rate may also be defined very conservatively as 
the number of completed (nonpartial) interviews (406) divided by 
the total number of cases not deemed to be ineligible (524). For a 
variety of reasons, a disposition of interviewed, ineligible or refused 
could not be given at the close of the field period for 27 establish 
ments. Some of these establishments had been contacted but 
requested a scheduling of the interview beyond the field period, 
others requested to be called back, and for some others the 
appropriate respondent had not yet been identified. Calculating the 
conservative completion rate, 77.5 percent of the establishments 
were completed interviews, 76.0 percent in the INS sample and 78.9 
percent in the general sample. 7
Although it had been expected that employers of illegal aliens 
would be much more hesitant about participating in a survey of 
hiring practices than randomly selected employers, the very small
Table 3-1 
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(and statistically insignificant) difference in each of the measures of 
completion and interview rates suggests that this was not the case.
(d) The Incentive Stipend
The "incentive stipend" was one method used by the interviewers 
to encourage respondent cooperation. Interviewers were instructed 
to offer the establishment a $15 stipend for the time of the 
respondent as a last ditch effort to prevent a refusal.8 The open- 
ended nature of the potential financial obligation was a consider 
able concern. In addition to emphasizing to the interviewers that the 
incentive was to be used only as a last resort, each of the 
interviewers had a survey maximum of only six stipends that could 
be granted to employers.
Of the 601 applicable situations, the stipend was offered in only 
32 instances. The interviewers were far more cautious than had been 
expected. With this caution, it is reasonable to assume that there 
would otherwise have been no interviews with these 32 establish 
ments. Interestingly, 17 of the 32 establishments (53 percent) offered 
the incentive consented to be interviewed and completed the 
questionnaire. Most surprising, however, was the fact that 14 of the 
17 who consented declined to accept the funds. The stipend was 
actually granted in only three instances.
The stipend was accepted by two small manufacturing establish 
ments (average size 16 employees) and one large service establish 
ment (197 employees). On average, there was no difference in firm 
size between the three establishments that accepted the stipend and 
the 14 influenced by the incentive but who did not accept it. There 
was also no pattern between acceptance of the stipend and whether 
the establishment was privately owned or part of a (nonfamily) 
corporation. There was, however, an effect of whether the respon 
dent was an owner (sole owner or partner) or an employee. Of the 
4 owner-respondents, 2 accepted the stipend, whereas of the 13 
employee-respondents only 1 accepted the stipend.
The interviewers reported that the offer of a stipend seemed to 
convey to the respondents a greater sense of seriousness or profes-
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sionalism regarding the survey, thereby eliciting a more favorable 
response. The magnitude of the stipend was presumably sufficiently 
small that the actual receipt of the funds was generally not a 
consideration. The combination of offering a modest financial 
incentive as a last-ditch effort to prevent a refusal and the limit on 
the number of stipends each interviewer could grant appear to have 
been a successful low-cost technique for discouraging refusals.
(e) Reworking Refusals
The procedures developed for reworking initial refusals also 
appear to have been successful. Of the 126 initial refusals, it was 
concluded that 24 were not likely to be converted, primarily because 
the respondent indicated that participating in the survey was against 
company policy or the company's attorney advised against partic 
ipating (table 3-2). Based on their characteristics, the other estab 
lishments were assigned to be reworked either by another one of the 
project's face-to-face interviewers, by a professional telephone 
interviewer, or by the Chicago coordinating staff.
Overall, 45 of the 102 establishments assigned for reworking 
consented to an interview. This resulted in a refusal conversion rate 
of 36 percent (45 out of 126). As there were four partial interviews, 
the refusal conversion rate for complete interviews was 33 percent 
(41 out of 126).
Although the sample size is small, the ratio of partial interviews 
to all interviews was higher in the refusal conversion than in the full 
sample, 8.9 percent as compared to 3.6 percent. This is not 
surprising since these establishments were initially less inclined to 
grant an interview.
It is not possible to evaluate the separate effectiveness of the three 
procedures for reworking refusals since the assignments were not 
random. For example, although the Chicago coordinating staff had 
the lowest conversion rate, they were also assigned the establish 
ments that were viewed as the most difficult to interview. Overall, 
however, the refusal conversion procedures appear to have been 
successful and worth the additional effort.
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Table 3-2
Final Disposition of Initial Refusals 
by Whether Reworked and by Method of Interview




























Not assigned 24 
for reworking
Total Initial Refusals 126
a. Includes 4 interviews later dispositioned as partials; 3 of these were completed by the 
telephone interviewers and 1 was completed face-to-face.
b. Professional telephone interviewers trained for reworking the refusals for this survey, 
c. Project coordinator and Field coordinator for the survey.
(f) Item Nonresponse
Item nonresponse can be a serious limitation on the usefulness of 
survey data. Beyond some point, extensive item nonresponse is 
functionally equivalent to refusing to participate. Although some 
surveys and censuses impute values for nonresponse, this was not 
done for this survey.
Item nonresponse may arise for two fundamental reasons. One is 
that the respondent, in truth, does not know the answer or has only 
such vague information that the respondent does not wish to offer 
a specific response. These are the truthful "don't know" responses. 
The other is that the respondent knows the answer but refuses to 
reveal the data. It is difficult to disentangle reasons for item 
nonresponse. Although both types of item nonresponse are evident 
in this survey, in general the response rate to individual questions 
was very high.
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(i) Partial Interviews—On the basis of item nonresponse, 15 of the 
421 interviews were classified as partial interviews and 406 were 
classified as completed interviews. This classification was done 
without regard for the sample from which the employer was selected 
and was based on predetermined criteria. An interview was classi 
fied "partial" if at least 20 percent of the responses were "don't 
know," blanks or invalid codes. Since no interviews were termi 
nated before the end of the questionnaire, this was not a source of 
partial interviews.
The 15 partial interviews included 11 from the illegal alien (INS) 
sample and 4 from the general sample of employers.9 The propor 
tion of partial interviews, that is, partial interviews as a percent of 
all interviews, was 5.4 percent for the INS sample, 6.9 percent for 
the Mexican aliens and 2.7 percent for the non-Mexican aliens. The 
rate was 1.8 percent for the general sample. Although these 
differences are small, they suggest somewhat greater difficulty in 
eliciting responses from the employers of Mexican illegal aliens, 
even though neither they nor the interviewers knew the source for 
the identification of the employers or the survey interest in illegal 
aliens. Partial interviews were nearly equally frequent in manufac 
turing and other services, but did not arise in the restaurant sector.
The analysis of item nonresponse suggests that partial interviews 
were more frequent in larger establishments with lower-skilled 
workers in jobs with high labor turnover. If so, many if not most of 
the "don't knows" in the partial interviews may have been truthful 
responses.
(ii) Completed Interviews—Among the 406 interviews classified as 
complete, the item nonresponse rates were very low for nearly all 
questions.
The establishments had the greatest difficulty responding to the 
question on the educational distribution of those currently em 
ployed (table 3-3). The nonresponse rate for the educational 
distribution of current employees was 12.3 percent overall, 16.6 
percent for the INS sample of employers and 8.5 percent for the
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Table 3-3
Item Nonresponse Rates for Completed Interviews






Wages by educational level
Length of training if no
previous experience
Length of training if
experienced in job
Reason adult men left
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a. Calculated as nonresponse to question (including "don't know," blanks and refusals) as 
percentage of combined total of valid responses and nonresponses. Totals vary from 
question to question because not all questions were asked of all respondents.
general sample. It is not obvious that this reflects a reluctance to 
answer the question. It is to be expected that employers, particularly 
those with a large immigrant component of the workforce, would be 
less knowledgeable about the level of formal schooling of their 
workers than many other characteristics. Both sets of employers 
had some difficulty, although less so, responding to the question on 
wages paid by educational level. The nonresponse rate for this set of 
questions was about 5 percent in each sample.
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The number of days of training required for a newly hired worker 
to learn to do well the most common male nonsupervisory job also 
generated some difficulty, particularly if the worker did not have 
prior experience. The nonresponse rate was 5 percent if the worker 
was experienced in the job and 10 percent if the worker had no 
previous experience (table 3-3). This may reflect the greater diffi 
culty in specifying the number of days of training required for 
workers with greater variation in prior work experience. The 
reasons why adult men and women left the establishment also had 
high item nonresponse rates, but these too may reflect truthful 
answers.
Perhaps the most important difference in item nonresponse rates 
between the sample of illegal alien employers and the general 
sample is the greater proportion of the former who did not respond 
to the question on the current employment of recent immigrants 
(i.e., immigrants in the U.S. less than five years). The rates were 8 
percent and 4 percent, respectively (table 3-3). Item nonresponse 
rates were lower for the question on the number of recent immi 
grants hired in the past year. The high nonresponse rates in the 
general sample for why male and female recent immigrants left the 
establishment in the past year are not statistically reliable because of 
the very small number of establishments that reported the departure 
of any recent immigrant workers. Part of the difficulty employers 
had with the "recent immigrant" questions may be a consequence 
of their not knowing how long their foreign-born workers have 
been in the U.S. This difficulty may be greater for the stock of 
workers than for the flow (new hires).
The questionnaire often required that the sum of the numerical 
responses to a set of questions equal a previously given total (e.g., 
that the racial/ethnic and sex distribution of employees sum to the 
total). Establishments were given the option of reporting compo 
nents as absolute numbers or as percents. The interviewers had 
hand calculators with them in order to check that the sum equaled 
the previously given total, and sought a reconciliation from the 
respondent if this was not the case. In spite of some initial
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misgivings about adding this complexity to the questionnaire, the 
interviewers reported that the procedure went smoothly. The 
requirement that these items sum to their previously reported total 
did not increase the nonresponse rate or apparently place an undue 
burden on the interviewer or respondent. Reconciliation on the spot 
proved to be much more effective than reconciliation after leaving 
the interview, and reduced the number of invalid (i.e., inconsistent) 
responses.
(iii) Summary—The analysis indicates that nonresponse rates 
were generally very low. Nonresponse rates were higher for ques 
tions that required information on the educational attainment of 
employees and on the reasons why employees left the establishment. 
There is some evidence that employers initially reluctant to partic 
ipate in the survey were more likely to grant interviews with higher 
nonresponse rates, and hence were also more likely to be classified 
as partial interviews. Partial interviews appeared only in the service 
and manufacturing sectors, and were more common among the 
establishments identified by an apprehended Mexican illegal alien. 
Among completed interviews, there is some evidence of higher 
nonresponse rates for the employers of illegal aliens, but the 
difference is very small. Overall, item nonresponse does not appear 
to have been a problem in this survey.
(g) Length of Interview
The length of a completed interview is calculated as the difference 
between the time of the start and finish of the interview, including 
interruptions when there was no lengthy break in contact. The 
length can be computed for 395 of the 406 completed interviews. It 
is not computed for the one (authorized) self-administered interview 
for an establishment of over 2,700 employees, when the ending time 
was not recorded, or when there was a lengthy break in contact, 
including a continuation of the interview on the following workday.
The range of interview length was from 10 minutes for two small 
establishments (13 and 50 employees) to 151 minutes (a service 
sector establishment with 30 employees). The average length was
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35.5 minutes, with little difference among industries, but with the 
interview taking about 6 minutes longer in establishments in the 
INS sample (table 3-4). Other things the same, interview length rises
Table 3-4
Mean and Standard Deviation of Length of 



































NOTE: Number of observations=395. 
a. Standard deviations in parentheses.
significantly with the number of employees (SIZE), is 3 minutes 
longer if the employer had been identified by an illegal alien 
(ILLEMP), and is 6 minutes longer if the interview was done in 
person (FACE) rather than over the phone. 10 It should be noted, 
however, that phone interviews (28 percent of the interviews) were 
generally limited to situations in which it was expected there would 
be fewer interruptions, rather than allocated solely through random 
assignment. There were no significant differences by industry 
(REST, SERVICE, with manufacturing as the benchmark) when 
other variables were held constant.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter discussed the methodology of the 1984 Chicago 
metropolitan area survey of the employers of illegal aliens. These 
employers were identified by an apprehended illegal alien on the
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INS Record of Deportable Alien (1-213) completed in the INS 
Chicago District Office in 1983. Demographic, labor market and 
migration data on the illegal alien were transcribed from the 1-213 
form. A parallel sample of establishments was selected from 
standard directories. Stratified random sampling was used.
The resulting data file is unique for research on illegal aliens. It 
includes matched employee-employer data—data on the employee 
(illegal alien) from the 1-213 and on the employer from the 
establishment survey. It also includes establishment data obtained 
in an identical manner from employers randomly selected from 
standard directories.
An attempt to locate establishments identified on the INS 1-213 
forms and in standard directories solely by telephone listing dem 
onstrated the difficulty of matching establishments identified in 
separate administrative records. Supplementing telephone listings 
with interviewer visits was responsible for the very high final match 
rate.
The survey methodology for interviewing establishments about 
their characteristics and their workforce appears to have been 
successful. There was no difficulty in obtaining the target of at least 
400 completed interviews from the 663 establishments selected in 
the sampling procedures. There were 406 completed interviews, 
excluding 15 interviews classified as partial interviews because of 
missing information.
Offering a small ($15) stipend to the establishment if it seemed 
that a refusal to participate was likely appears to have been a 
successful low-cost procedure. The quota on the number of stipends 
each interviewer could grant encouraged the interviewers to use it 
selectively. The offer seems to have conveyed a greater sense of 
seriousness and professionalism. Overall, 14 of the 17 establish 
ments that consented to the interview only after the offer of the 
stipend declined the funds. Acceptance of the funds was more likely 
if the respondent was also the owner.
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The probability that an establishment would be in the INS 
sample is a positive function of the number of employees, but this 
is not the case for the general sample. As a result, the number of 
ineligible establishments (fewer than five employees) is greater in the 
general sample, and the average number of employees in the eligible 
establishments is larger in the INS sample.
The conservative completion rate, that is, completed interviews as 
a percent of all cases not known to be ineligible, was 77 percent 
overall. It was 76 percent in the INS sample and 79 percent in the 
general sample. Thus, the samples did not differ in the interview 
completion rate.
Although partial interviews and item nonresponse were more 
common in the INS sample, the differences were very small. Item 
nonresponse rates were generally very low, although establishments 
had some difficulty with certain questions. These included reporting 
the level of schooling of their current workers, wages by schooling 
level, reasons why employees left the establishments, and current 
employment of persons who were "recent" immigrants. It is not 
surprising that these are the data elements with which the employers 
had the most difficulty. The nonresponses appear to be genuine 
"don't knows" rather than attempts to conceal information.
The survey procedures developed for this project appear to have 
been very successful for generating a unique data file on the illegal 
alien labor market. The survey methodology could be applied 
elsewhere for the study of illegal ah'ens. In addition, many features 
of the methodology could be used fruitfully for other surveys of 
employers, particularly on other sensitive issues.
NOTES
For example, consider the activities of the Congressionally appointed Select 
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, whose primary mandate was 
to study and make recommendations regarding illegal aliens. The commission 
funded virtually no research on illegal aliens in the United States, and in its 
research report reprinted results of illegal alien research completed long before
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the commission was established. As a result, a major study effort failed to 
advance knowledge in this area. See, Select Commission (1981).
2 For a detailed discussion of the survey methodology, see Chiswick (1985, 
Volume I, chapter 2). The questionnaire, interviewer training manual and other 
documents related to conducting the survey are reproduced in Chiswick (1985, 
Volume II).
3 The survey was limited to men primarily because of the small number of illegal 
alien women apprehended by the Chicago District Office.
4 Preference was to be given to face-to-face interviewing, although in certain 
circumstances telephone interviews were conducted. Initial contacts were by a 
letter from the Principal Investigator, followed by either a telephone or in-person 
contact by the interviewer. Since most of the initial contact of the establishment 
by the interviewers was to be by telephone, the face-to-face interviewers were 
chosen for their skills in face-to-face and telephone interviewing.
5 Offering a summary of findings written in nontechnical terms that would be 
relevant for the respondent's industry generated considerable interest. Of the 421 
employers interviewed, 155 requested a summary of findings. The specially 
prepared summary included cross-tabulations of wages, unionization and other 
variables by industry and size of establishment, without reference to illegal 
aliens.
6 Using predetermined criteria, interviews were classified as partial if 20 percent or 
more of the responses were "don't know," blanks or invalid codes. Partial 
interviews are discussed below in greater detail.
7 These completion rates are on a par with the results from the small sample pilot 
survey of illegal alien employers conducted earlier (Chiswick and Fullam, 1980). 
In the pilot survey 78 percent of the 39 eligible illegal alien employers completed 
the interviews.
8 For many small firms this would in effect be a direct payment by check to the 
respondent/owner.
9 Distribution of partial interviews:
	Other 
Sample Manuf. Restaurant services Total
INS Sample 7 0 4 11
Mexican Alien 5 49
Non-Mexican Alien 2(a) 002
General Sample 1 34
All 8 0 7 15
(a) One from Europe/Canada, one from Other Latin America.
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10 Regression analysis of length of interview (LENGTH) in minutes:
Variable Coefficient t-ratio
SIZE 0.031 3.13







Adjusted R2 0.111 
Number of observations 395
4 
Illegal Alien Labor Market Behavior
This chapter examines the labor market behavior of the sample of 
illegal aliens apprehended in the metropolitan Chicago labor mar 
ket. Particular attention is devoted to the analysis of their wages 
and the characteristics of their employers. Wages are perhaps the 
best single measure of adjustment in the labor market. The wage 
analysis focuses on the effects of duration in the U.S., country of 
origin, and method of entry, among other variables. The analysis of 
employer characteristics focuses on the extent to which illegal aliens 
experience job mobility. The greater their job mobility the more 
likely are they to receive wages approximating their maximum 
productivity and the greater their opportunities for upward mobil 
ity. While there are no direct data on the issue of the "exploitation" 
of illegal aliens, a heated political issue, exploitation is minimized 
when there are opportunities for job mobility.
In this chapter the illegal alien is the unit of observation. Most of 
the analysis is based on the data abstracted from the INS Record of 
Deportable Alien (1-213) for nearly 300 apprehended illegal aliens. 
For a subsample of nearly 200 aliens, the data on the alien's 
characteristics are matched with the employer survey responses. 
This provides a rather unique data file, not merely for the analysis 
of illegal aliens, but also for labor market analysis in general—a 
data file that combines worker and employer/workplace character 
istics. Sample sizes are reduced, however, to the extent there are
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missing values for one or more of the variables in the analysis. To 
preserve the integrity of the data there was no imputation of missing 
values.
Section I describes the characteristics of the sample of illegal 
aliens using standard descriptive statistics. Section II is the multi- 
variate statistical analysis of wages of the illegal aliens. In section 
III, the employer characteristics of illegal aliens are analyzed 
analytically and statistically. This is followed by a discussion of 
exploitation of illegal aliens in section IV. The chapter closes 
(section V) with a summary and conclusion.
/. Descriptive Statistics
The data on the illegal alien from the INS administrative record, 
the 1-213, include age, nationality, marital status, method of entry, 
duration in the U.S. in the most recent stay, and wages (see Exhibit 
1). Unfortunately there are no data on the person's schooling and 
the quality of the reported "occupation" was too poor for these 
data to be transcribed. The employer data are from the lengthy 
survey and include a variety of information about the characteris 
tics of the establishment and its workforce (see Exhibit 2). Because 
of the nature of the study, it was not possible to ask the employer 
questions about the alien who identified the establishment.
To increase statistical efficiency, subject to the project's budget 
constraint, stratified sampling was used. The count of illegal aliens 
by origin and industry does not reflect their proportion in the 
population of apprehended illegal aliens. In the sample of 292 
apprehended illegal aliens, 64 percent were Mexican nationals, 7 
percent were from Europe and Canada, 20 percent were from other 
parts of the Americas, and 9 percent were from the rest of the world 
(table 4-1). 1 Although data were not available on the illegal alien's 
total length of stay in U.S., there are data on the duration of the 
current stay. About 20 percent of the sample had been in the U.S. 
for less than 6 months, 8 percent for 7 to 12 months, 38 percent for 
more than 1 but less than 4 years, 26 percent for more than 4 but
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Table 4-1
Distribution of Apprehended Illegal 














































































































































less than 8 years, and 9 percent for 8 or more years. This is 
considerably longer than the average length of the most recent stay 
for all illegal aliens apprehended by INS. But a longer length of stay 
is to be expected for illegal aliens apprehended in the interior of the 
country.
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In the sample, nearly all of the Mexican illegal aliens (96 
percent) and most of those from other parts of Latin American 
(79 percent) were EWIs, that is, they had entered the U.S. 
without inspection (table 4-2). Most of the European/Canadian
Table 4-2
Status at Entry of Apprehended 








































a. EWI is "entry without inspection."
b. Includes one observation with country not reported.
illegal aliens had violated a visitor visa, while most of the illegal 
aliens from Asia, Africa, the Middle East or elsewhere violated a 
visitor or student visa. These patterns are very similar to the 
distribution of method of entry discussed in chapter 2 for all 
apprehended illegal aliens.
The apprehended male illegal aliens in the Chicago sample had an 
average age of 30.6 years, had been in the U.S. illegally for an 
average of only 3.4 years during their most recent stay, and slightly 
more than half of the sample (55 percent) reported they were not 
married. Thus, the sample can be characterized as being comprised 
of young adult, unmarried men who have been in the U.S. a 
relatively short period of time. This characterization has been found 
in other studies. The 1975 David North-Marion Houstoun nation 
wide sample of nearly 800 apprehended illegal aliens also concluded 
that they were predominantly single young adults. In the North-
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Houstoun sample, the average age for the men was 29 years and 
their average duration for all stays was 3.2 years (Chiswick, 1984).
A survey of Mexican illegal aliens who had returned to their 
home villages in the state of Jalisco, a major source of illegal 
migrants, also found that at the time of the illegal migration they 
were predominantly young adult single males with low levels of 
education (Diez-Canedo, 1980). However, they did not come from 
the poorest of families, which cannot afford to finance the migra 
tion. They tended to be "underemployed" members of families that 
owned or had access to farmland, rather than day laborers.
The characterization of illegal aliens as young, single and recent 
arrivals is not limited to men. A comparative study for Los Angeles 
of legal and illegal alien women born in Mexico also found that the 
illegal aliens are young, single and recently arrived compared to 
legal immigrants (Simon and De Ley, 1984).
The relatively short duration in the U.S. of apprehended illegal 
aliens, about three years, may be contrasted with the longer average 
duration of immigrants in census data. In the 1980 Census, among 
adult foreign-born men the average duration in the U.S. was 18.3 
years for white immigrants (excluding Hispanics), 13.0 years for 
Mexican immigrants, and 9.2 for Asian immigrants.
Part of the difference in duration of residence in the U.S. between 
legal and illegal aliens may be due to the very rapid increase in 
illegal immigration in recent years, which lowers the average 
duration in the U.S. of the stock of illegal aliens. Another expla 
nation may be a greater extent of return migration for illegal aliens, 
thereby reducing the relative proportion with a long period of 
residence. For many illegal aliens, particularly from Mexico, the 
migration is viewed as a mechanism for capital accumulation to buy 
a house or invest in a business when they return home. Hence, for 
many, illegal migration is a temporary phenomenon, with newer 
and younger cohorts replenishing older cohorts.
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In addition, with a longer duration of residence, some illegal 
aliens acquire permanent resident alien status through either regular 
immigration procedures (e.g., obtaining a visa as a relative of a U.S. 
citizen or resident alien) or an "adjustment of status" when 
apprehended. There may also be a difference in measurement 
concepts with the illegal alien data referring to time actually in the 
U.S. during their most recent stay and the census data referring to 
the length of time since the person first came to the U.S.
Finally, the probability that an illegal alien is apprehended can be 
expected to decline with duration of residence. The knowledge and 
skills acquired through living and working in the U.S. can be 
expected to increase the alien's ability to avoid detection. Or, 
alternatively, those illegal aliens with characteristics associated with 
a high probability of apprehension are arrested sooner rather than 
later. If so, the average duration in the U.S. of apprehended illegal 
aliens would underestimate the average duration of all illegal aliens.
It is the relatively low duration of residence of the apprehended 
illegal aliens that accounts for their young average age and high 
proportion who are not married. In general, inter-regional and 
international migrants tend to be young and unmarried. And these 
characteristics are more intense for migrants who view the move as 
temporary, or as part of a circular migration.
An important characteristic of the 1-213 data is information on 
wages. An hourly wage is generally reported. For respondents who 
reported their wage on some other basis (e.g., day or week) the data 
were converted to an hourly wage by assuming full-time employ 
ment.
The average hourly wage at the time of apprehension in 1983 was 
$4.52 for the entire sample, with Mexican nationals receiving $4.42 
and other nationals receiving $4.73. These rates are substantially in 
excess of the federal legal minimum wage of $3.35 that was 
applicable during this period. Very few of the illegal aliens reported 
a wage below the federal legal minimum; only 45 illegal aliens (16 
percent) out of the 279 workers for whom a wage was reported. Of
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these, 18 were in the restaurant industry (of whom 12 were Mexican 
nationals), 26 were in other services (16 Mexicans), and 1 ( a 
non-Mexican) was in manufacturing. The federal minimum wage is 
lower than $3.35 per hour for those in the restaurant sector where 
a tip-credit may be applicable (e.g., busboys). Also, the procedure 
for estimating the hourly wage may have resulted in its being 
underestimated for workers in part-time employment who reported 
a daily rate or a weekly salary. Yet, the absence of full compliance 
with federal minimum wage laws cannot be discounted (Ashenfelter 
and Smith, 1979).
//. Analysis of Wages
The hourly wages of illegal aliens are analyzed in this section 
using data on the illegal alien's own characteristics and the charac 
teristics of his employer. Multiple regression analysis is used to 
relate the wages of the alien to the explanatory variables. The 
variables used in this analysis are described in table 4-3 and the 
means and standard deviations of the variables are reported in table 
4-4. The multiple regression analyses are reported in tables 4-5 and 
4-6, which differ only in the latter's including variables for duration 
of employment in the current or most recent job. In these tables, 
columns (1) and (2) rely exclusively on the demographic data from 
the 1-213 form, with column (1) based on the full sample and 
column (2) based on the subsample with employer data. A set of 
employer characteristics is added to the matched subsample analy 
sis in column (3), while column (4) recomputes the equation without 
some variables found to be generally statistically insignificant.
(a) Structure of the Regression Equation
The regression analysis is based on the standard human capital 
earnings function modified for the analysis of immigrant adjust 
ment (Chiswick, 1979; 1984). The natural logarithm of the wage is 
regressed on measures of labor market experience, duration of U.S.
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Table 4-3
Description of Variables Used in Regression Analyses 
of Wages and Employer Characteristics
Code Description
Aliens characteristics
WAGE, LNWAGE Hourly wage and its natural logarithm.
YREXP, YREXPSQ Years of "labor market experience," measured as 
years since age 15; the square of YREXP.
TIMEUS, Years in the U.S. calculated as difference between
TIMEUSSQ month and year of apprehension and month and
year of last illegal entry; the square of TIMEUS.
NOTMAR If person is not "married spouse present" =1, if 
married spouse present=0 .
MEXICO Country of citizenship—Mexico (benchmark); 
EUROCAN Europe and Canada; other Latin America and 
LATAMER Caribbean; Asia, Africa and Other. 
ASIA/AFRI
EWI Status at entry—Entry without inspection (bench-
STUDENT mark); student visa; visitor visa and small number
VISITOR of other visas.
JOBTENURE, Years working for the current or most recent 
JOBTENSQ employer calculated as the difference between 
month and year employment ended (or date of 
apprehension of currently employed) and month 
and year employment started. The square of 
JOBTENURE.
NOTCURR Dichotomous variable equal to unity if not em 
ployed at time of apprehension (i.e., wages refer to 





Industry of employment—Manufacturing and 
construction (benchmark); restaurant; other ser 
vice.
Employers Characteristics
MSTCOMSK Skill level of most common male nonsupervisory 
job—Skilled (professional, administrative, techni 
cal craft or skilled production) = 1; Unskilled (op- 
___ erative, service, handler, agriculture)=0._____




UNION Union membership among nonsupervisory work 
ers (percent).
NOHSWAGE, Average hourly wage paid to those who did not
HSWAGE, graduate from high school, to high school gradu-
COLWAGE ates (without college), and to college graduates.
(For a typical 25-year-old male with two years
work experience with the establishment.)
SUBBR Type of ownership—Subsidiary or Branch = 1, 
Otherwise=0.
IMMIGHIRE Recent immigrants among persons hired in past 
year (percent).
SIZE Number of employees.
PVTOWN Privately owned establishment (proprietorship, 
partnership or family held corporation) = 1, 
otherwise=0.
SEASONAL Seasonal patterns in employment =1, no 
seasonally=0.
LOWEDUC Employees with less than a high school degree 
(percent).
FORMAL Newly hired employees recruited by formal meth 
ods (percent).
ENGSPREQ Newly hired employees required to be able to 
speak English (percent).
UNIREQ Newly hired employees required to have union 
membership (percent).
MINORRACE Hispanic and Asian-origin employees (percent).
PAYDAYWK Frequency of pay—Daily or weekly =1, less 
often=0.
LEGALIMM Newly hired immigrants who entered the U.S. 
legally (percent).
CURRIMM Recent immigrants (immigrated within the last 5 
years) among employees (percentage).
ORIGINSM Employees of same race-ethnic origin as the illegal 
alien (percent).
DEPORT Any illegal alien employee deported in last year = 
1, otherwise=0.
HSPOWN Hispanic ownership: Hispanic=l, non-Hispanic 
_____________or nonfamily held corporation = 0._______
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residence, marital status, and country of origin. Years of schooling, 
an important variable for most analyses of earnings, is not available 
in the data. Job tenure and method of illegal entry recorded from 
the 1-213 and employer characteristics from the establishment 
survey, variables not available in analyses for the foreign born using 
census and other survey data, are included in the analysis.
The 1-213 includes data on the illegal aliens' earnings per unit of 
time from the current or most recent employer. As with most survey 
or administrative data, ambiguities arise as to whether the wage 
data are net or gross of payroll taxes and other deductions, and as 
to whether the data include tips or other supplemental compensa 
tion (e.g., free meals). It is assumed that the aliens consistently 
reported gross earnings, excluding nonpecuniary supplements. 
Most of the aliens reported hourly wage rates. For those who 
reported their earnings on some other basis, such as a day or week, 
standard daily or weekly hours based on the assumption of full-time 
employment was used to convert to an hourly wage rate.
In most labor market surveys, data are not available on the 
respondent's actual number of years of labor market experience. It 
is, however, generally assumed that adult men have been in the 
labor force continuously since leaving school. Then, if it is assumed 
that schooling starts at age five and that one year of schooling is 
completed for each year of attendance, it has become customary to 
measure the number of years of potential labor market experience 
as age minus years of schooling minus five years. Unfortunately, 
with the absence of data on years of schooling it is not possible to 
use this technique. For this study, labor market experience is 
measured by the number of years since age 15 (YREXP). This may 
actually be the most appropriate measure. Illegal aliens tend to have 
low levels of formal schooling. For example, the schooling level in 
the North-Houstoun sample of adult illegal alien men was 5.2 years 
for Mexican nationals and 9.9 years for other nationals (Chiswick, 
1984). Ten years of schooling would imply entry into the full-time 
labor force at about age 15. Labor market experience acquired prior
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to age 15, particularly in the country of origin, may not be very 
productive at older ages in the U.S.
The measure of duration of U.S. residence (TIMEUS) is the 
number of years and fractions of years between the date of action 
(i.e., when the 1-213 form was completed) and the date of last entry 
into the illegal status. This would be the date of last entry into the 
U.S. for most illegal aliens, such as EWIs and those who entered 
with fraudulent documents. It would be later for some who entered 
with a valid visa and subsequently violated the conditions of the 
visa.
Another unique feature of the 1-213 is information on the 
duration of employment with the current or most recent employer. 
This permits the explicit incorporation of variables for job tenure 
into the regression analysis of wages. It is hypothesized that, 
controlling for total and U.S. labor market experience, a longer job 
tenure is associated with higher earnings. This arises in part because 
of the positive effects on earnings of greater firm-specific training. It 
also arises from a better matching of workers and jobs. Where the 
match is poor, earnings are lower and separations (quits or lay-offs) 
occur sooner.
The job tenure variable (JOBTENURE) is measured from the 
1-213 form as the number of years (and fractions of a year) from the 
start to the end of the period of employment for the current or most 
recent employer. For those still employed at the date of apprehen 
sion, which is most of the sample, this date was used as the end 
point. A dichotomous variable is also created for those not 
currently employed (NOTCURR). Because job tenure variables are 
generally not available, the regression equations are reported for 
comparative purposes with and without these variables.
There are, therefore, three measures of labor market experience, 
total experience (YREXP), U.S. experience since the most recent 
illegal entry (TIMEUS) and job tenure (JOBTENURE). When job 
tenure is not in the equation, controlling for TIMEUS, the variable 
YREXP measures the partial effect on wages of labor market
Table 4-4
Means and Standard Deviations of Characteristics of 
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Table 4-5
Regression Analysis of Wages for Apprehended Illegal Aliens 












































































































































































NOTE: Benchmark is an illegal alien who entered the U.S. without inspection: in column (1), 
(2), and (3) is from Mexico; in column (3) and (4) works in the manufacturing industry.
a. Accept the null hypothesis of identical structures between illegal aliens with and without 
employer data. Calculated F-value of 1.26 from the Chow-test is less than the 5 percent 
critical value F(ll;250;.05) =1.83.
b. Estimated coefficient=stated coefficient x 10 .
t-ratios are in parentheses.
n.a. denotes the variable was not included in that regression.
experience in the origin country and in previous stays in the U.S. 
Similarly, controlling for YREXP, the variable TIMEUS measures 
the differential effect on wages in the U.S. of current stay and 
previous experience. When JOBTENURE is in the equation, 
TIMEUS measures the differential effect of U.S. experience prior to 
the current or most recent job.
Other variables included in the regression analysis are dichotomous 
variables for marital status (NOTMAR=1 if not married), and 
status at entry (STUDENT =1 if student visa, VISITOR =1 if 
visitor or other visa, with EWI as the benchmark). Country- 
of-origin dichotomous variables are also included with Mexico 
serving as the benchmark. The country groupings are Europe and 
Canada (EUROCAN), Latin America other than Mexico (LAT- 
AMER) and Asia and Africa (ASIA/AFRI). Since the dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage, the coefficient
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Table 4-6
Regression Analysis of Wages for Apprehended Illegal Aliens,
Controlling for Job Tenure 
(Dependent Variable: Natural Logarithm of the Hourly Wage)












































































































































Table 4-6 (Continued)_____________ 






















































NOTE: Benchmark is an illegal alien who entered the U.S. without inspection: in columns (1), 
(2), and (3) is from Mexico; in columns (3) and (4) works in the manufacturing industry.
a. Estimated coefficient = stated coefficient x 10
t-ratios are in parentheses.
n.a. denotes the variable was not included in the regression.
of a dichotomous variable may be interpreted as approximately the 
percentage difference in earnings due to that characteristic. The 
approximation is more exact the closer to zero is the estimated 
coefficient.
(b) Estimated Equation—Aliens' Characteristics
The regression equations in columns (1) and (2) of table 4-5 are 
for the full sample and the subsample of illegal aliens with employer 
survey data. A Chow-test was performed to test the null hypothesis 
that there is no significant difference between the coefficients in the 
subsample for which there are no employer data and the subsample 
with employer data. The test indicated that the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected (calculated F-value = 1.26; the 5 percent critical
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F-value F(ll;250; .05) = 1.83). That is, the two samples are 
consistent with the hypothesis that they are drawn from the same 
population.2
For the full sample, wages rise significantly but at a decreasing 
rate with experience in the country of origin (YREXP) and with 
duration of U.S. residence (TIMEUS) (table 4-5, column 1). In the 
full sample, the partial effect on U.S. wages of an extra year of 
preimmigration experience is 1.2 percent when evaluated at 10 years 
of labor market experience (YREXP = 10). This is about the same 
as in census data on the foreign born. An extra year in the U.S. 
rather than in the country of origin raises earnings by 5.5 percent 
when evaluated at the mean duration of 3.4 years.
The regression equations suggest that relative to the benchmark, 
Mexico, there are no country-of-origin wage differences, holding 
constant the illegal aliens' experience and demographic character 
istics, except for 20 percent higher earnings for illegal aliens from 
Europe/Canada in the sample with employer data (table 4-5, 
column 2). When the method-of-entry variables are deleted, the 
European/Canadian origin variable is highly significant and the 
coefficient implies about 20 to 25 percent higher earnings for 
European/Canadian illegal aliens. 3 Nearly all of the European/Ca 
nadian illegal aliens had violated a visitor visa.
It will be shown below that the significantly higher earnings of the 
European/Canadian illegal aliens relative to those from Mexico 
disappear when employer characteristics are held constant. The 
earnings advantage of European/Canadian illegal aliens arises from 
their being more successful in obtaining jobs with employers who 
offer higher wages. They are more likely to be employed in 
unionized, higher wage structure, manufacturing establishments. 
This may reflect unmeasured dimensions of their higher level of 
skill, including formal schooling, fluency in English, and a greater 
transferability of their skills to the U.S. labor market.
There does not appear to be a significant effect of marital status 
on earnings. The absence of a marital status effect might seem
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surprising since being married is generally associated with a large 
and highly significant positive effect on earnings for the native and 
foreign born in census and survey data. Married men may earn 
more than single men because they make greater investments in 
labor market training, rather than because of innate ability or 
health. If so, the estimated earnings differences would be smaller or 
nonexistent for a young population, such as the one under study, 
that is currently making investments in on-the-job training. Alter 
natively, there may be a different effect of marital status on the 
selection criteria for migration among illegal aliens. Favorable 
self-selection, in terms of ability, motivation and health status, may 
be more intense among single men than among married men in an 
illegal alien population. For example, if men who have less ability or 
ambition or who are in poorer health are less likely to marry, 
among nonmigrants single men would have lower earnings. Among 
migrants, however, the single men may be the most highly moti 
vated for their own economic advancement and may have the 
weakest family ties in the origin. Hence, they may have made 
greater investments specific to the U.S. labor market.
The data suggest lower earnings among those who entered with a 
student visa (STUDENT) compared with those who entered with 
out inspection.4 This may reflect the smaller set of wage opportu 
nities available to those who combine schooling and work (Lazear, 
1977), or a smaller amount of actual U.S. labor market experience 
for the same number of years in the U.S.
The regression equations in table 4-6 repeat those in table 4-5 but 
include the job tenure variables. Adding these variables to the 
regression equation systematically increases the model's explana 
tory power. Controlling for total and U.S. labor market experience, 
earnings rise at a decreasing rate with duration of employment on 
the current job. When evaluated at the mean job tenure of 1.8 years, 
an extra year of experience with the same employer raises earnings 
by 7 to 8 percent (table 4-6 columns (1) and (2)) over the effect of 
working for another U.S. employer. Controlling for employer 
characteristics (columns (3) and (4)), the partial effect of job tenure
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when evaluated at the mean falls to 4.5 percent. The strong effect on 
wages of current employer experience may arise from greater 
firm-specific training and from longer job tenures when there is a 
better match of worker skills and job characteristics.
About 8 percent of the sample reported wages for a job that 
ended prior to the date of apprehension. These workers reported 
about 15 percent lower wages when other variables are the same. 
Part of this differential arises from the time gap between the end of 
employment and the apprehension. Perhaps more important may 
be the reverse causation—those who received lower wages because 
of lower productivity or a poorer job match are more likely to be 
without a current job.
When job tenure and current employment are held constant, the 
partial effects of some of the other explanatory variables are altered. 
The most important change is the sharp decline in the partial effect 
of U.S. labor market experience. The two variables JOBTENURE 
and TIMEUS are highly correlated (R=0.58), in part because the 
former is generally bounded by the latter. 5 Note, however, the 
change in the interpretation of TIMEUS when job tenure is held 
constant. It now measures the differential effect on earnings of U.S. 
experience prior to joining the current employer.
The effect of an extra year of experience on U.S. wages at an 
establishment is greatest if the experience is with the establishment, 
less so if it is with another U.S. employer and least if it is 
preimmigration experience. That is, the effect of experience on the 
wages of illegal aliens is greatest the more recent it is and the more 
transferable it is to the current employer.
(c) A Comparison with the North-Houstoun Sample
The North-Houstoun sample of male apprehended illegal aliens 
may be used to test the robustness of the findings in the analysis of 
the wages of illegal aliens. The North-Houstoun sample was taken 
in 1975, was nationwide, included a variable for years of schooling 
completed (EDUC) and included several measures of wages, but
82 CHAPTER 4
had no data on employer characteristics. Because of a large number 
of missing values, only about 400 observations are available when 
schooling is included in the analysis.
Using the same regression methodology, table 4-7 reports the 
results for three dependent variables, total earnings in 1974 
(EARN), U.S. earnings in 1974 (USER), and hourly pay in the 
most recent (1975) U.S. job (HRPA). Since the dependent variables 
are expressed in natural logarithms, comparisons of coefficients can 
be made across the equations and with the more recent Chicago 
survey. The data indicate a small, although highly statistically 
significant, effect of an extra year of schooling on earnings for illegal 
aliens. It is 3.9 percent for annual total earnings, 3.2 percent for 
annual U.S. earnings, and 2.3 percent for the U.S. hourly wage. By 
way of comparison, in census data the partial effect of schooling on 
weekly earnings is about 5 percent for the foreign born and 7 
percent for the native born.
Table 4-7
Regression Analysis of Earnings for





















































































































SOURCE: David North and Marion Houstoun, microdata file on apprehended illigal aliens, 
1975.
a. Men age 16 and over who worked in the U.S. for at least two weeks during their most 
recent stay.
b. EDUC is years of schooling; YREXP and YREXPSQ are years of labor market 
experience and its square; LNWW is the log of weeks worked; TIMEUS and TIMEUSSQ 
are total number of years of U.S. experience and its square; WESTCO and SWBORD are 
west coast and southwest border, respectively. Country categories are Mexico (bench 
mark), Europe and Canada (EURCAN), Asia and Africa (ASIA/AFRI), the Caribbean 
(CARIB) and Central and South America (SOAMER).
c. LNEARN is natural logarithm of annual earnings in 1975, LNUSER is logarithm of U.S. 
earnings in 1975, LNHRPA is logarithm of hourly pay in the U.S. Annual earnings 
expressed in hundreds of dollars.
d. Variable not entered, 
t-ratios in parentheses.
In the North-Houstoun sample, an extra year of premigration 
labor market experience (evaluated at 10 years and controlling for 
weeks worked) raises earnings by about 2.8 percent for total annual 
earnings, 2.0 percent for U.S. annual earnings and 1.4 percent for 
hourly earnings. The larger coefficients for schooling and experience
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when total annual earnings is the dependent variable implies that 
illegal aliens with more schooling and more experience in the 
country of origin work more hours per week in the U.S.
The partial effect of experience in the hourly wage equations, 
when evaluated at 10 years, is 1.2 percent in the Chicago survey 
(table 4-5), and is 1.4 percent in the North-Houstoun data. The 
difference is remarkably small.
Recall that an extra year of U.S. labor market experience in the 
Chicago survey raised wages by 5.5 percent when evaluated at 3.4 
years, the mean duration in these data (table 4-5). When evaluated 
at this same value, an extra year of U.S. experience in the 
North-Houstoun data raised annual earnings by 4.5 percent, U.S. 
earnings by 5.3 percent and U.S. hourly earnings by 5.6 percent. 
The differences between the Chicago and North-Houstoun coeffi 
cients are very small and not statistically significant.
Even after controlling for years of schooling and lower earnings 
on the West Coast and especially along the southwestern border, 
the North-Houstoun data show a pattern of earnings differences by 
country of origin. Other things the same, European/Canadian 
illegal aliens earn significantly more than Mexican illegal aliens, 
although there are no differences between Mexican and other illegal 
aliens. The coefficient for European/Canadians is larger in the 
North-Houstoun data (about 40 percent higher wages) than in the 
Chicago survey (about 25 percent higher wages). The difference 
may be reflecting the effects on wages of unmeasured differences in 
their location.
The large regional differences in wages in the North-Houstoun 
data are striking. Controlling for schooling, total labor market 
experience, duration in the U.S. and country of origin, wages for 
illegal aliens are much lower (20 to 30 percent lower) along the 
southwestern border (SWBORD), and somewhat lower (by 10 to 15 
percent) along the West Coast (WESTCO) than in the rest of the 
country. These regional differentials do not reflect differences in the 
distribution of illegal aliens by country of origin. There is a
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significant West Coast effect for non-Mexican aliens, but only for 
the hourly wage rate. All of the southwestern border observations 
were Mexican nationals. When the data are limited to Mexican 
illegal aliens, other things the same, hourly earnings are about 20 
percent lower along the southwestern border and 10 percent lower 
along the West Coast than in the rest of the country (primarily the 
midwestern states).6 The regional differences for weekly earnings 
(i.e., annual earnings with a statistical control for weeks worked) 
are even larger among the Mexican illegal ah'ens.
It is difficult to reconcile such large regional effects as reflecting 
merely differences in the cost of living. To the extent that they 
represent real differences in hourly wages and/or employment 
opportunities they would constitute compelling forces for the 
redistribution of Mexican illegal aliens away from these entry points 
to the rest of the country. It is, therefore, not surprising that the 
Midwest is believed to have experienced a very sharp increase in the 
number of Mexican and other Western Hemisphere illegal aliens in 
the past decade, in spite of the seemingly sluggish performance of 
the Midwest economy.7 For Mexican illegal aliens it was still an 
area of outstanding opportunities.
(d) Adding Employer Characteristics to the Equation
Previous labor market research has shown there is a systematic 
relationship between employer or workplace characteristics and the 
wages of workers. For example, wages tend to be higher in larger 
establishments and where there is a union.8 The direction of 
causation is ambiguous—some of the earnings advantage of work 
ers in larger and more highly unionized establishments may reflect 
unmeasured dimensions of greater worker skill. Some other issues 
related to employee compensation have been subject to less study, 
such as whether wages are higher, other things the same, the greater 
the skill level of co-workers and whether the type of ownership of 
the establishment matters.
In general, it has been difficult to test hypotheses regarding the 
effect of establishment or workplace characteristics on the wages of
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workers because of the relative scarcity of data that match worker 
characteristics to employer or establishment characteristics. A 
unique feature of the illegal alien survey is that worker and 
establishment characteristics are matched for a sample of nearly 200 
observations. The illegal aliens for whom the matched data are 
available do not seem to differ in any material way from the other 
illegal aliens in the full sample.
This section augments the regression analysis of illegal alien 
wages by adding to the earnings function several variables describ 
ing the establishment's characteristics. These variables are defined 
in table 4-3.
One variable is the size of the establishment, as measured by the 
number of employees (SIZE). Tests during the development of the 
survey instrument indicated that the respondents could reliably 
report the number of employees, but not any other measure of size, 
such as value added. The type of ownership of the establishment is 
treated as a dichotomous variable, where SUBBR=1 if it is a 
branch or subsidiary of a larger enterprise, and SUBBR=0 if it is 
an independent establishment.
Dichotomous variables are also included for the type of industry, 
where REST and SERVICE designate restaurant and other service 
establishments, respectively, with manufacturing as the benchmark. 
It is hypothesized that industrial characteristics influence reported 
wage rates, with wages being lower in the restaurant sector where 
some tip income and in-kind income in the form of free meals may 
not be included in the reported wage. It has also been suggested that 
there is less industry-specific and firm-specific training in most 
restaurant jobs and that this is particularly attractive for illegal ah'en 
workers (Piore, 1979 and Bailey, 1985). If so, there would be a 
flatter experience earnings profile for the restaurant sector; new 
workers would have higher wages but more experienced workers 
would receive lower wages.
Several establishment characteristics that describe co-workers are 
also included in the equation. One is the degree of unionization of
II. Analysis of Wages 87
the workforce, as measured by the proportion of nonsupervisory 
workers who are union members (UNION).9 Two others describe 
the skills of workers. A wage scale variable is the average wage paid 
to a hypothetical 25-year-old high school graduate who has worked 
for the establishment for two years (HSWAGE). The other is the 
skill level of the most common male nonsupervisory job (MST- 
COMSK). It is treated as a dichotomous variable which takes the 
value unity if this job is an administrative, professional, technical 
craft or skilled production job, and is zero if it is an operative, 
service, handler, or agricultural job. It is hypothesized that 
UNION, HSWAGE and MSTCOMSK all have positive effects on 
the illegal alien's wage.
There is much interest in the extent to which illegal aliens work 
within an immigrant or ethnic enclave and the effect, if any, of 
ethnic enclave employment on their wages and job mobility. It is 
often speculated that ethnic enclave establishments pay lower 
wages, perhaps because the workers they hire have less job mobility 
and fewer skills, even after controlling statistically for readily 
measured dimensions of skill. Indeed, it is often said that illegal 
aliens are locked into low-paying ethnic enclave establishments 
because of a fear of being reported to the immigration authorities. 
Perhaps as temporary workers they prefer jobs that utilize the skills, 
including language skills, of the country of origin, and avoid jobs 
that require investments specific to the U.S. Alternatively, for 
relatively new immigrants, whether legal or illegal, ethnic enclave 
employment may serve a transitional or "half-way house" function 
where some of the skills specific to their country of origin have 
greater "transferability" than in the general labor market. Foreign 
language fluency may be the most obvious country-of-origin skills 
that are more highly rewarded in the enclave than outside.
The degree of ethnic enclave employment is measured by the 
proportion of recent immigrants (i.e., immigrants in the U.S. five or 
fewer years) among workers hired in the past year (IMMIGHIRE). 
Because of the potentially offsetting effects of the several hypotheses
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regarding this variable, there is no unambiguous prediction as to the 
sign of its coefficient in the wage equation.
The means and standard deviations of the establishment variables 
are reported in table 4-4, overall, and separately for the Mexican 
and non-Mexican illegal aliens. The Mexican illegal aliens work in 
larger establishments (SIZE is larger by about 3 percent), but they 
are less likely to be unionized, and have a slightly lower skill level 
for the most common male nonsupervisory job. There is little 
difference in type of ownership, over one-quarter work in subsidiary 
or branch establishments. The Mexican illegal aliens work in 
establishments that have a smaller proportion of recent immigrants 
among those hired in the past year, 20 percent compared with 25 
percent for the others.
The establishment characteristics are added to the regression 
equation for wages in table 4-5 column (3). Several of the variables 
in the equation, some measuring the alien's characteristics and 
others measuring the establishment's characteristics, are not statis 
tically significant. Deleting several of the insignificant variables, the 
equation is re-estimated in table 4-5 column (4). Because of missing 
values for some variables in the establishment data, the sample size 
increases when certain variables are deleted from the regression 
equation.
There is a significant positive relationship between the wages of 
the illegal aliens and the degree of unionization (UNION). Going 
from a 0 percent to 100 percent unionization, for example, raises the 
hourly wage of the illegal alien, other things the same, by about 11 
to 14 percent. This is on the same order of magnitude as the 
measured effects of unions on wages in industry and general 
population studies (Lewis, 1983 and Freeman, 1984).
Other things the same, wages are about 16 to 19 percent higher 
when the illegal alien works in an establishment in which the most 
common male nonsupervisory job is skilled (MSTCOMSK). To 
some extent this variable may be reflecting unmeasured dimensions 
of the alien's own skill, such as a higher level of schooling or being
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a highly skilled worker. Wages are also higher the greater the rate of 
pay of a "standardized worker" (HSWAGE). This may be reflecting 
interestablishment differences in money wage levels. Although all of 
the establishments are located in the Chicago SMSA, there may be 
local area differences in wages, perhaps reflecting transportation 
costs, or interestablishment differentials for other nonpecuniary 
aspects of the job, even when the major industry category is held 
constant.
The wages of illegal aliens are significantly lower in the restaurant 
sector than in manufacturing. Part of this 16 percent differential 
may compensate for unmeasured dimensions of job-related income, 
such as tips and in-kind income in the form of free meals. There is 
no significant difference in wages between the other service jobs and 
manufacturing jobs.
The wages of illegal aliens are apparently not related to the size or 
type of ownership of the establishment; both SIZE and SUBBR 
have very low t-ratios. That is, controlling for proxies for the skill 
level and wage structure of the establishment, as well as the illegal 
alien's characteristics, there is no direct independent effect on the 
alien's wages of either size or type of ownership of the establish 
ment.
The extent to which recent immigrants were among those hired in 
the past year (IMMIGHIRE) is apparently unrelated to the illegal 
alien's wages. That is, other things the same, working in an 
establishment that hires relatively more recent immigrants does not 
depress the wages of illegal aliens. Thus, the ethnic enclave patterns 
of employment (discussed in greater detail below) do not appear to 
depress the wages of illegal aliens.
Total labor market experience, U.S. experience and firm-specific 
experience are highly significant variables, even when establishment 
characteristics are held constant (table 4-5 and 4-6). Note, however, 
that the partial effects of U.S. and firm-specific experience are lower 
when the establishment's characteristics are included in the equa 
tion. With a longer duration of residence there is a tendency for
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illegal aliens to obtain employment in higher wage establishments 
(higher wage structure, more highly unionized, higher skill level). 
Hourly wages are significantly lower (by more than 20 percent) for 
those who entered the U.S. under a student visa, when the 
statistically insignificant variables are deleted from the equation. 
This may reflect the narrower range of job opportunities that are 
available for those combining schooling and work.
In summary, the hourly wages of the apprehended illegal aliens 
are significantly related to their individual characteristics and the 
characteristics of their employers. Wages are higher for those with 
more preimmigration labor market experience, who have been in 
the U.S. longer, who worked for their current employer a longer 
period of time, and who did not enter the U.S. with a student visa. 
The wages of illegal aliens are also higher the greater the degree of 
unionization, the higher the wage structure of the employer, and the 
higher the skill level of the employer's most common male nonsu- 
pervisory job. Money wages are lower in the restaurant sector than 
in manufacturing and other services.
These findings suggest that establishments that are more highly 
unionized, have a higher wage structure, and have a more highly 
skilled workforce may be hiring and retaining the more productive 
illegal aliens, that is, they engage in "creaming."
This hypothesis can be tested by analyzing employment patterns 
as a function of the illegal alien's labor market experience. Of 
course, a positive relation between the duration in the U.S. and 
more favorable employer characteristics would reflect the beneficial 
effects of more time for job search and better information networks, 
as well as more narrowly defined concepts of skill.
///. Employer Characteristics
The empirical analysis of wages suggests the importance of 
employer characteristics to the earnings of illegal aliens. Employer 
characteristics are not necessarily determined independently of the
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alien's own characteristics. This section is concerned with the 
variation in employer characteristics among the apprehended illegal 
aliens. The analysis focuses on two types of explanatory variables. 
One is labor market experience, measured by the number of years 
since age 15 (YREXP) and the number of years in the U.S. 
(TIMEUS). The other is country of origin. 10 The purpose of the 
analysis is to determine the extent to which employer characteris 
tics, such as size of establishment, extent of unionization and wage 
level, vary systematically with the alien's labor market experience 
and country of origin. 11 The regression equations are reported in 
table 4-8.
(a) Effect of Duration of Residence
The industrial characteristics of the employer vary systematically 
with the illegal alien's duration of residence in the country. Con 
trolling for age and country of origin, illegal aliens who have been 
in the U.S. longer (TIMEUS) tend to work in larger and more 
highly unionized establishments (SIZE, UNION) and are more 
likely to be in the manufacturing sector (MANUF) (table 4-8). 12 
The establishment is more likely to be a branch or subsidiary 
(SUBBR) than to be independently owned and operated. Illegal 
aliens are less likely to work for a sole proprietorship or partnership 
the longer their duration in the U.S.
The wage and skill level of their co-workers also varies with 
duration of residence. The longer they have been in the U.S. the 
more likely are illegal aliens to be working in establishments with 
higher wage structures (NOHSWAGE, HSWAGE, COLWAGE), 
and in which the most common male nonsupervisory job is skilled 
(MSTCOMSK). This may reflect the selection of more skilled or 
more "Americanized" illegal alien workers by employers who offer 
higher wages within occupational levels or who have a higher 
average skill level in their workforce. It may also reflect the job 
search benefits from greater labor market information due to a 
longer exposure to the U.S. labor market. On the other hand, a 
greater duration of U.S. residence has no significant relationship
Table 4-8
Analysis of Employer Characteristics 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































NOTES: Entries are regression coefficients, with t-ratios in parentheses.
Benchmark is an illegal alien from Mexico. Sample sizes vary because of incomplete reporting of employer characteristics. Maximum potential 
sample size equals 184.
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with whether the alien works for an estabh'shment that uses formal 
recruiting methods (FORMAL) or the degree of seasonality 
(SEASONAL) in employment.
The data can be used to test whether ethnic enclave patterns of 
employment diminish with duration of residence for illegal aliens. 
There is no statistically significant relation between duration of 
residence and several establishment characteristics, including the 
extent to which workers are required at the time of hire to speak 
English (ENGSPREQ), the proportion of Hispanics and Asians 
among the workforce (MINORRACE), the proportion of immi 
grants among recent hires (IMMIGHIRE), the proportion of 
immigrants in the nonsupervisory workforce (CURRIMM), or 
whether the other employees are of the same ethnic origin 
(ORIGINSM).
These patterns indicate that the degree of ethnic enclave employ 
ment in this sample of apprehended illegal aliens does not diminish 
with duration of residence. Perhaps there were too few long- 
duration illegal aliens for there to be noticeable effects on ethnic 
enclave employment. 13 Alternatively, since employment in the eth 
nic enclave does not have a depressing effect on wages, there may be 
no particular incentive for a change in the degree of ethnic enclave 
employment with duration of residence.
(b) Effect of Premigration Experience
Controlling for duration in the U.S., the number of years since 
age 15 (YREXP) measures labor market experience prior to the 
most recent episode as an illegal alien. When duration in the U.S. 
and country of origin are held constant, premigration experience 
appears to be generally unrelated to the employer characteristics 
considered in this analysis (table 4-8). One possible exception is a 
marginally significant tendency for the employers of older illegal 
aliens to be more likely to pay workers daily or weekly rather than 
less frequently (biweekly, monthly). This may be an index of a lower 
quality job, but in the absence of other significant effects it may
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merely be the consequence of random sampling. Other studies of 
legal and illegal aliens also show a much weaker effect of premigra- 
tion experience on labor market outcomes than is the case for 
postmigration experience (Chiswick 1979, 1984).
(c) Effects of Country of Origin
The data can be used to explore differences in employer charac 
teristics by country of origin. Some striking patterns emerge.
Compared with Mexican illegal aliens, European and Canadian 
illegal aliens are more likely to work in larger (SIZE), more highly 
unionized (UNION) establishments, and are more likely to be in 
manufacturing (MANUF) (table 4-8). 14 The Europeans and Cana 
dians are also more likely to work in establishments with higher 
wage scales. Illegal aliens from other areas do not differ from the 
Mexican nationals in these characteristics. These patterns may 
reflect the higher levels of schooling and occupational skills of 
illegal aliens from more highly developed source countries 
(Chiswick, 1984; North and Houstoun, 1976).
On the other hand, it is only the Asian/African illegal aliens who 
are more likely than Mexican nationals to work for employers for 
whom the most common male nonsupervisory job is in the skill 
category (MSTCOMSK). The Asian/African illegal aliens are less 
likely to work at an establishment the larger the proportion of 
workers without a high school degree (LOWEDUC). These findings 
suggest that the Asian/African illegal aliens have a higher skill level 
than those of Mexican origin.
Mexican illegal aliens are significantly more likely to work in 
establishments that reported seasonality in their employment (SEA 
SONAL). The much lower cost of to-and-fro migration and illegal 
entry for Mexican nationals than for nationals of other countries 
may provide greater incentives for Mexican nationals to accept, if 
not prefer, seasonal employment in the U.S. 15
Illegal aliens from Asia and Africa are less likely to work in 
establishments with workers of their same ethnic origin
98 CHAPTER 4
(ORIGINSM) and are more likely to work in establishments that 
require a speaking knowledge of English (ENGSPREQ). Because of 
the relatively small numbers of Asian and African immigrants in the 
Chicago labor market and the heterogeneity of their origins and 
languages, Asian/African illegal aliens may be less able than the 
Hispanics or Europeans to find employment in "ethnic enclaves." 
It will be shown in the next chapter, which analyzes establishment 
characteristics, that illegal alien employers are more likely to 
demonstrate ethnic enclave characteristics than are randomly se 
lected employers. They are more likely to be owned by a Hispanic 
and employ other Hispanic and Asian workers.
IV. Exploitation of Illegal Aliens
The popular literature contains many allegations of exploitation 
of illegal aliens by unscrupulous employers. 16 Exploitation is usually 
not defined, but is generally thought to mean either the payment of 
subminimum wages or the payment of wages lower than their 
productivity. A corollary of the existence of exploitation is that 
illegal aliens have little or no job mobility. While there are 
individual horror stories of illegal aliens kept in a virtual bondage, 
these appear to be isolated instances. Given the elaborate informa 
tion network among illegal aliens, especially among the more 
numerous Mexican illegal aliens, and the considerable degree of 
geographic mobility, it would be difficult for any employer to 
consistently pay lower wages than illegal aliens could obtain 
elsewhere and still recruit and retain illegal alien workers.
The survey data provide some inferential evidence on the exploi 
tation issue. To the extent that exploitation is defined as payment of 
a wage below the federal minimum wage, it appears to be rare or 
nonexistent in these data. As discussed above, at a time when the 
standard federal minimum wage was $3.35 per hour, the average 
wage for the Mexican illegal aliens in the sample was $4.42 per 
hour, and for the other illegal aliens $4.73. Only 45 of the 279 aliens 
(16 percent) who reported their earnings received less than the legal
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minimum wage. Of these, 18 (of whom 12 were Mexican nationals) 
were in the restaurant sector where their reported wages may not 
have included tips and the value of free meals. Because of the 
"tip-credit," a lower federal minimum wage is applicable for many 
covered restaurant workers. Another 26 aliens (16 Mexican nation 
als) were in other services and one alien (not a Mexican national) 
was in manufacturing. For those in part-time employment who 
reported a daily or weekly wage, the estimation procedure under 
estimated their hourly wage. Others may have been in jobs not 
covered by the federal minimum wage (e.g., local lawn care 
services).
To the extent that very low wages do exist, they are received only 
by very recent illegal ah'ens. The data indicate a sharp rise in wages 
with duration of residence, with wages showing the sharpest 
increase in the first few years in the U.S. While to some extent this 
reflects low-wage recipients either quickly leaving the country or 
being apprehended early, it may also reflect direct improvements in 
wage opportunities with duration of residence for the same worker.
Even after controlling for age and country of origin, apprehended 
illegal ah'ens in the U.S. a longer period of time are more likely to 
be working in more skilled, higher-wage sectors of the labor market. 
This suggests considerable labor market mobility, which would be 
inconsistent with a widespread practice of exploitation.
There may be some confusion of ethnic enclave employment with 
exploitation. The degree to which illegal aliens work within an 
ethnic labor market does not seem to decline with duration of U.S. 
residence. There is, however, no evidence in these data that ethnic 
enclave employment has an adverse effect on illegal alien wages. 
Apparently, there is enough mobility in and out of ethnic enclave 
employment so that wages are equalized for workers of a given skill 
level.
In a study of the wage rates received in the U.S. by migrants who 
had returned to Mexico, Kossoudji and Ranney (1984) investigated 
the effect of legal status. In this sample of 540 men, Kossoudji and
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Ranney found that earnings were the same, other measured vari 
ables held constant, for legal migrants and for those who entered 
the U.S. legally but worked in violation of their visa or entry papers 
and hence were illegal aliens. They also found that both groups 
earned about 30 percent more than those who entered the U.S. 
illegally, with the earnings differential varying inversely with the 
level of skill. This suggests that it is not being an illegal alien worker 
per se that is associated with lower U.S. earnings, but some other 
unmeasured characteristic associated with entry without inspection. 
It also suggests the potential sample selection bias inherent in 
comparative studies of legal and illegal aliens. That is, observed 
earnings differences may arise from the unmeasured characteristics 
that determine legal status, rather than from differential opportu 
nities in the U.S.
Douglas Massey (1987) used data on about 300 legal and illegal 
aliens from four communities in Mexico to study the exploitation 
issue. Although illegal aliens have significantly lower U.S. wages 
than the legal aliens, the wage differential disappears when skill and 
demographic variables are held constant. There was also no effect of 
legal status, other variables the same, on whether the illegal alien 
was in an unskilled job. Massey did find, however, that the illegal 
aliens had a shorter period of employment on their most recent U.S. 
job. This would result in less investment in training specific to their 
U.S. employer.
David North and Marion Houstoun asked the nearly 800 
apprehended illegal aliens in their 1975 nationwide survey whether 
they thought that, as a result of their illegal status, they were paid 
lower wages than legal workers doing the same work. They report 
that 16 percent felt they were paid lower wages (North and 
Houstoun, 1976, pp. 132-4). This belief was most common among 
illegal aliens working in the counties along the Mexican border, and 
was rare elsewhere. It was also rare among non-Mexican illegal 
aliens. In addition, they indicate that "illegals who reported exploi 
tation of this kind were almost twice as likely to have been in the
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United States less than two years (about half of the sample) than 
illegals who had been in the United States two or more years."
The greater perception of exploitation along the Mexican border 
and among recent illegal aliens in the North-Houstoun data may 
arise from the illegal aliens inappropriately comparing themselves 
with legal workers who have been in the U.S. for several years, 
rather than with recent immigrants. Furthermore, illegal aliens in 
the U.S. for several years, particularly if they are not in the 
economically depressed border counties, may be more effective in 
finding jobs in which their skills are most highly rewarded. In 
addition, given a high degree of voluntary (and due to deportations, 
involuntary) to-and-from migration among recent illegal aliens 
along the border, employers may view them as a less stable 
workforce, and hence a less attractive workforce for employer- 
financed investments in training. This may result in less training 
overall and hence in wages that are lower than those received by 
legal immigrants.
In the Rita Simon and Margo DeLey (1984) survey of legal and 
illegal alien Mexican women in Los Angeles, the respondents were 
asked if they felt they had been discriminated against in the U.S. 
labor market on the basis of their nationality or legal status. In the 
illegal alien sample, about 20 percent reported discrimination. 
Nearly half said that their employer knew of their illegal status 
when they were hired. Interestingly, among those in the control 
sample of legal aliens, 20 percent also reported discrimination. 
There was, therefore, no difference in the perception of discrimina 
tion between legal and illegal aliens. No other information was 
provided on the characteristics of the women who reported that 
they experienced discrimination.
Another perspective is provided by Wayne Cornelius' study of 
illegal aliens who returned to their home villages in Mexico. 
Cornelius (1976, p. 27) reports:
Illegal migrants are not necessarily paid at lower rates than legal 
workers at their place of employment—indeed, none of the illegals 
whom we interviewed claimed that they had been discriminated
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against in this way. Rather, wages paid for certain types of jobs 
(particularly in agriculture) were uniformly low, at least by United 
States standards. 1
In summary, it appears that concerns over widespread exploita 
tion of illegal aliens are without foundation. The low wages of 
illegal aliens seems to be a result of their low skill level. They tend 
to have low levels of schooling and, perhaps because they and their 
employers perceive their migration as temporary, they have fewer 
investments in training specific to the U.S. labor market.
V. Summary
This chapter has analyzed the labor market behavior of the 
sample of nearly 300 male illegal aliens apprehended in the Chicago 
metropolitan area labor market in 1983. The illegal aliens tend to be 
young (average age 30.6 years) and to have been in the U.S. a short 
period of time during their most recent illegal stay (average 
duration 3.4 years).
The average hourly wage in 1983 of the illegal aliens was $4.52, 
where Mexican nationals received $4.42 and other nationals re 
ceived $4.73. Only 16 percent, nearly all in restaurant and other 
service jobs, reported wage rates below the federal minimum level. 
Not all of the reported wages below the federal minimum level were 
in violation of federal law.
The regression analysis of wages showed that there are systematic 
effects of worker and employer characteristics. The skills of illegal 
aliens matter; wages are higher the greater the number of years of 
premigration and postmigration labor market experience, and the 
greater the number of years working for their current employer. 
Wages are lower for those who entered under a student visa. Money 
wages are lower in restaurant jobs, but this may reflect the 
under-reporting of tip income and the value of free meals.
Part of the rise in wages with the duration of residence in the U.S. 
or with tenure on the current job is attributable to the characteris 
tics of the employer. Illegal aliens have higher wages if they work
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for "more desirable" establishments, that is, establishments that are 
unionized, have a higher wage structure, and have relatively more 
skilled workers.
The wages of illegal aliens, other things the same, are apparently 
unrelated to the size of the establishment, whether it is indepen 
dently owned or a branch/subsidiary, and the proportion of recent 
immigrants among those hired in the past year, when the firms' 
wage level and other variables are held constant. The latter implies 
that the tendency for illegal aliens, particularly those from Mexico, 
to work with other recent immigrants of the same origin—the ethnic 
enclave effect—does not tend to depress their wages. The smaller set 
of job opportunities available to illegal aliens in the ethnic enclave 
may be offset by the advantages from working in an environment in 
which country-of-origin skills, particularly language skills, may be 
more valuable. Opportunities for employment outside the ethnic 
enclave would eliminate any differences in wages between ethnic 
enclave and outside jobs.
The characteristics of the employers of illegal aliens vary system 
atically with the aliens' characteristics. The acquisition of more 
knowledge and skills relevant for the U.S. labor market with a 
longer duration of residence increases the likelihood of working for 
a larger, more highly unionized establishment in manufacturing 
that has a higher wage structure and a more highly skilled work 
force. European and Canadian illegal aliens are more likely to work 
for these more desirable establishments. Mexican illegal aliens are 
more likely to be employed in seasonal jobs. This many complement 
illegal alien preferences for seasonal employment, given the low cost 
of to-and-fro migration for Mexican nationals. There is evidence of 
ethnic enclave employment patterns, especially for Mexican illegal 
aliens, and, in this sample, this tendency does not diminish with 
duration of residence in the U.S.
These findings indicate that it would be inappropriate to charac 
terize illegal aliens, as is often done, as being locked into low-wage 
dead-end jobs with flat experience-earnings profiles or as having so
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little job mobility that they are susceptible to employer exploitation. 
The data suggest that illegal aliens in the U.S. a longer period of 
time earn higher wages and work for different types of employers. 
Job mobility, rather than immobility, may be the best characteriza 
tion of the U.S. labor market experience of illegal aliens. Perhaps 
this is not surprising since, in spite of U.S. law, they have engaged 
in one of the most dramatic types of mobility—international 
migration. Yet, their wages tend to be low by U.S. standards 
apparently because of their very low skill levels.
NOTES
1 There is very little difference in duration in the U.S. and method of entry by 
country of origin between the subsample for which employer data are available 
and the subsample whose employers could not be identified or interviewed.
2 This increases one's confidence that the employer survey data are drawn from a 
random sample of employers of apprehended illegal aliens, rather than a selected 
sample.
3 Country-of-origin regression coefficients comparable to the regressions com 
puted for table 4-5, columns (1) to (3), but without the method of entry 
variables. 41
Sample with employer characteristics
Country of Full Not Held Held 
Origin Sample Constant Constant**
(1) (2) (3)
EUROCAN 0.2112 0.2503 0.0912
(2.619) (2.699) (0.992)
LATAMER -0.0395 -0.0327 -0.0469
(-0.081) (-0.620) (-0.949)
ASIA/AFRI -0.0684 0.0420 -0.0105
(-0.886) (0.465) (-0.122)
Number of
Observations 272 184 170
a. Holding constant experience, time in the U.S., and marital status, 
b. Also holding constant wages paid high school graduates, degree of unionization, and 
industry.
4 The negative coefficient becomes statistically significant when job tenure vari 
ables are held constant.
5 In 3 percent of the 286 cases for which TIMEUS and JOBTENURE can be 
calculated job tenure is longer than the recent illegal stay. This could arise if an
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alien stays on a job longer than is permitted by a temporary work permit, or 
more likely, if the illegal alien leaves the U.S. and retains his job when he returns. 
For 14 percent employment with the current employer began within the first 
month of the current illegal stay.
6 Partial effect of the region variables for Mexican illegal aliens (N=212).
Dependent Variable Partial Effect of — —————————
Regional Variables LENEARN LNUSER LNHRPA
WESTCO -0.35 -0.32 -0.10 
(-2.34) (-2.19) (-1.35)
SWBORD -0.40 -0.52 -0.21 
(-2.88) (-3.84) (-3.25)
The larger coefficients for annual earnings may reflect a shorter workweek along the 
West Coast and the southwestern border.
7 Most of the Mexican illegal aliens in the North-Houstoun data who were not on 
the West Coast or along the southwestern border were in the Midwest. Hence, 
the estimated differential reflected Midwest wage opportunities.
8 The union effect is well-established (see for example, Lewis, 1983 or Freeman, 
1984). For research on the positive effect of working in a larger firm or 
establishment on wages, see, for example, Mellow (1982).
9 Data are not available on whether the illegal alien is a member of the union.
10 Mexico (MEXICO) serves as the benchmark. The dichotomous country vari 
ables are Europe/Canada (EUROCAN), other Latin America and Caribbean 
(LATAMER), and Asia, Africa and other areas (ASIA/AFRI).
11 Tests indicated that marital status and legal status at entry generally have no 
statistically significant effect on the establishment characteristics under study.
12 Barren, Block and Lowenstein (1987) show that larger employers engage in 
more search in the labor market, offer higher starting wages and provide more 
on-the-job training.
13 Only 19 percent of the observations were in the U.S. for more than 5 and less 
than 10 years, and only 5 percent were in the U.S. for 10 or more years.
14 There are no country of origin differences in the tendency to work for a 
subsidiary or branch (SUBBR) or in a privately owned establishment in contrast 
to a corporation (PVTOWN).
15 For evidence consistent with a preference for seasonal migration patterns among 
Mexican illegal aliens, see Cornelius (1976) and Diez-Canedo (1980).
16 Although it has been a violation of federal law to discriminate on the basis of 
race, ethnicity or national origin since the mid-1960s, discrimination against
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aliens per se was not illegal. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, 
which instituted penalties against employers for knowingly hiring illegal aliens, 
also makes it illegal for employers to discriminate against aliens who have a legal 
right to work.
17 A collaborator of Cornelius confirmed this conclusion, and elaborated that the 
issue of an illegal status did not matter since if a higher wage were available 
elsewhere the aliens would quit and take the other job (Diez-Canedo, 1980, p. 96 
and 106).
5 
The Employers of Illegal Aliens
The public policy interest in illegal aliens appears to focus almost 
as much on their employers as it does on the aliens themselves. 
There is a presumption that most illegal aliens come to the U.S. for 
work. They are drawn to the U.S. by the prospect of high wages and 
perhaps greater opportunities for job training, relative to what they 
could receive in their home country. Alternatively, it is argued that 
U.S. employers use wages and training opportunities as a lure to 
attract predominantly low-skilled workers to: relieve labor bottle 
necks, perform jobs that native workers "will not" perform, or 
further depress wages or discourage unionization in low-wage, 
generally nonunion jobs. These alternatives are, of course, the 
supply and demand sides in the illegal alien labor market.
This public policy focus on employers is unique. There is no 
similar attention given to other sources of the well-being of illegal 
aliens, such as the income transfer, educational and social service 
systems. Nor is there a similar degree of attention devoted to the 
competition by illegal aliens in consumption. There are no propos 
als for sanctions against school districts or universities that "know 
ingly" enroll illegal aliens or against landlords who "knowingly" 
rent to illegal aliens. Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
public school districts cannot discriminate against school-age illegal 
alien children by denying them access or charging tuition as a 
condition of enrollment.
In the spirit of the public policy debate, and recognizing the 
importance of labor market impacts, this study of illegal aliens has 
focused on the labor market and on the employers of illegal aliens.
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It would be futile to try to learn about illegal alien employers merely 
through a study of illegal aliens. Even if the illegal aliens themselves, 
rather than their 1-213 forms, could have been surveyed, data on 
many of the most interesting and important characteristics of their 
employers could not be obtained. Few workers, legal or otherwise, 
can report on many characteristics of the establishment in which 
they work including its age, business organization, pay scale, 
provision of job training, etc. And, even if illegal aliens could 
provide this information, analyzed in isolation the data would be 
meaningless. The data can make sense only in a comparative 
perspective. Hence, for this project, data were collected on employ 
ers of illegal aliens and on randomly selected employers.
The establishment survey that is integral to the analysis is unique. 
There is no comparable systematic survey of employers of illegal 
aliens, and none that provides linkages with the alien or, for 
comparative purposes, a parallel sample of randomly selected 
employers.
As indicated in chapter 3, the establishments interviewed for the 
employer survey were drawn from two sources. One source was the 
Record of Deportable Alien, the 1-213 form, filed in the Chicago 
District Office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 
1983. One data element on the 1-213 is the name and address of the 
current or most recent employer in the U.S. Only establishments in 
the Chicago SMSA were eligible for the survey. The sample of 
illegal aliens was stratified by nationality (Mexican and non- 
Mexican) and by industry (manufacturing, restaurant and other 
services), but random sampling was used within the six nationality- 
industry cells. The employers identified from this source are referred 
to as the INS sample.
The other source of employers were establishments in the Chi 
cago SMSA listed in industry directories for manufacturing and 
services, and telephone listings in the Yellow Pages for restaurants. 
Random sampling was used within each industry strata except that 
the Chicago-Suburban proportions in the INS sample were retained
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in the general sample. It is not known whether the establishments in 
the general sample actually employed illegal aliens, knowingly or 
otherwise. There is, however, a presumption that within major 
industry categories, randomly selected employers are likely to be 
less intensive in their employment of illegal aliens than are estab 
lishments identified by apprehended illegal aliens as their employ 
ers.
This chapter presents the analysis of the differences in the 
characteristics of the employers selected from the two sources. 1 
Because it was not possible to remove illegal alien employers from 
the general sample, the analysis generates downward biased esti 
mates of differences between the employers of illegal aliens and 
those who do not hire illegal aliens. An important theme of this 
chapter will be to try to disentangle the effects on the characteristics 
of their employers of the temporary or recent migration status of 
the aliens from their illegal work status. Section I provides descrip 
tive statistics on the response rates and the age and detailed industry 
of the establishments in the sample. Section II is a regression 
analysis based on a simple model of the differences between the 
illegal alien employers and randomly selected employers. Section III 
focuses on the issue of the "underground economy."In particular, it 
is concerned with whether the employers of illegal aliens are more 
likely to pay workers in cash rather than by check and are less likely 
to require that newly hired workers report their social security 
number. An analysis of employer differences in the extent of 
on-the-job training provided by the establishment is in Section IV. 
Section V considers differences in the understanding of legal liabil 
ities during the hiring process for the two groups of employers. 
Section VI summarizes the findings in the chapter.
/. Some Descriptive Statistics
There had been a concern that the employers of illegal aliens 
would avoid any contact with interviewers. If the stereotypical 
illegal alien employer is a small, "underground" economy (or
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informal economy) establishment, it would do its best to avoid 
revealing its existence and hiring practices. Even though at the time 
of the interview hiring illegal aliens was not illegal, there was reason 
to believe that many employers thought it was (Chiswick and 
Fullam, 1980). The expectation was that illegal alien employers 
would be far more difficult to interview than the general sample 
employers. Fortunately, this expectation proved to be incorrect.
The full sample includes 406 employers for whom a questionnaire 
was completed. Of these, 193 were identified by an apprehended 
illegal alien on the 1-213 form and, by coincidence, 213 were from 
the general sample. The interview completion rate may be defined 
conservatively as completed interviews as a proportion of establish 
ments not known to be ineligible for the survey. The denominator 
includes refusals, partial interviews and establishments for which no 
disposition has been established, as well as completed interviews. 
The conservative interview completion rate was 76 percent for the 
INS sample of employers and 79 percent for the general sample. 
The partial interview rate, that is, the proportion of interviews with 
more than a minimum amount of item nonresponses, was low in 
both samples, although it was slightly higher for the employers 
identified from the INS records. The item nonresponse rate among 
completed interviews was also low for most questions and there was 
no systematic pattern on the basis of whether the employer had 
been identified by an apprehended illegal alien. Thus, illegal alien 
employers do not appear to be more difficult to interview than 
randomly selected employers.
It is often said that illegal alien employers are "fly by night" 
operators. That is, that they are relatively new businesses, at the 
margin of profitability, with a high failure rate. If not for labor that 
is "cheap" because of the workers' illegal status, they could not stay 
in business. It was not possible to obtain data on profit rates, but it 
was possible to address the issue of the "age" of the establishment.
The respondents were asked to report the number of years the 
establishment has been in operation. There appears to be no
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difference in the distribution of age of establishment between the 
INS illegal alien sample and the general sample.2 About 2 percent of 
the establishments in the INS sample and 3 percent of the estab 
lishments in the general sample were relatively young—they had 
been in business less than two years. About one-quarter of the 
establishments in each sample had been in operation for at least two 
and up to ten years, and nearly three-quarters in each sample had 
been in business ten or more years.
As a result of the sampling procedures, however, the INS sample 
of employers consists of large establishments, and larger establish 
ments tend to have been in business longer. Controlling for the size 
of the establishment, there is a nonlinear effect of its age on the 
probability the establishment is on the INS sample. 3 Among the 
youngest establishments the probability that it is in the INS sample 
rises with age, although at a decreasing rate, until a peak at 4.7 
years. Beyond 4.7 years the probability decreases with age. This 
pattern is not consistent with the "fly by night" estabhshment 
hypothesis, even though illegal alien employers are less numerous 
among older firms when establishment size is held constant.
An analysis of the distribution of illegal alien employers by 
industry is limited by the stratification procedures employed in the 
survey. Because of the predominance of restaurants in illegal alien 
employment and greater homogeneity in this sector, stratified 
sampling was used with target numbers of cases for each of three 
broad industries: manufacturing, restaurants, and other services. 
Within these broad sectors (and two nationality categories in the 
INS sample) employers were randomly selected.
The specific product or service of the establishment was recorded 
and each establishment was coded by industry. The manufacturing 
category includes durable and nondurable manufacturing as well as 
construction. Within the manufacturing category, construction 
firms are about 16 percent (15 establishments) of the general sample 
but only 4 percent (3 establishments) of the INS sample. Among 
manufacturing establishments, almost two-thirds were in durable
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goods and about one-third were in nondurable goods in each of the 
two samples.4 The highly unionized nature of the construction 
industry in the Chicago SMSA may be responsible for the small 
proportion of construction establishments in the INS sample.
There are some differences in the distribution by specific industry 
in the other (nonrestaurant) services category, although the sample 
sizes are too small to do separate analyses by subsector. 5 In the INS 
sample of 62 service sector establishments, landscaping is the most 
common service, comprising over one-quarter of the establishments 
and nearly half of the establishments identified by a Mexican illegal 
alien. Retail trade is the next most common industry with just under 
one-quarter of the establishments. For non-Mexican illegal aliens, 
who appear to have a higher level of skill, the health sector and 
transportation and utilities rivaled retail trade. In the general 
sample, retail trade was the most common service industry with 
nearly two-fifths of the establishments, and, in spite of a deliberate 
oversampling to try to have greater comparability with the INS 
sample, landscaping consisted of about one-twentieth of the general 
sample. Business and repair services along with finance, insurance, 
and real estate were each about one-fifth of the establishments.
Clearly, in the nonrestaurant service sector, landscaping firms are 
a major source of employment for Mexican illegal aliens and a 
prime target of INS enforcement activities. In the Chicago area, 
with a long, cold winter, landscaping is an ideal type of employment 
for low-skilled workers from farm or rural backgrounds seeking 
seasonal employment. The landscapers work in monolingual (Span 
ish) crews and many workers may return to the same employer year 
after year.
The non-Mexican illegal aliens in other services have a sectorial 
distribution close to that in the general sample. However, they 
appear to be somewhat more concentrated in the health and 
transportation and utilities sectors, and less so in finance, insurance 
and real estate (FIRE). The underrepresentation of illegal aliens in 
the FIRE sector may arise from fewer opportunities for the
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employment of less-skilled, non-English speaking workers and the 
licensing requirements for some jobs (e.g., real estate agents).
In summary, the data suggest considerable similarity between 
establishments in the INS and general samples. They were equally 
cooperative in granting and completing the interview and have 
about the same age distribution. Illegal aliens appear to be widely 
dispersed among the industries in the Chicago area economy. 
Mexican illegal aliens are more intensive in the restaurant and 
landscaping sectors. Jobs in these sectors are well-suited to low- 
skilled workers with rural backgrounds who view themselves, or are 
viewed by their employers, as temporary migrants and therefore do 
not make large investments in job training specific to the U.S., and 
have a preference for jobs with seasonal employment. Illegal ah"ens 
in general, but especially Mexican illegal aliens, tend to be under- 
represented in the finance, insurance and real estate industries. Jobs 
in these sectors are more likely to be white collar, and hence require 
a higher level of skill, including facility in English.
//. Differences Between Illegal Alien Employers 
and Other Employers
This section is concerned with developing and testing hypotheses 
that may differentiate employers of illegal aliens from randomly 
selected employers. The dependent variable is the dichotomous 
variable ILLEMP, which is unity if the establishment was identified 
by an apprehended illegal alien (INS sample) and is zero if it was 
selected from the general population of employers. This is actually 
an oversimplification of the concept of employment of illegal aliens 
which is necessitated by the data. The number of employers in the 
general sample who also employ illegal aliens is not known. In 
addition, among those who do employ illegal aliens, regardless of 
the sample, there are no data on the number or the share of illegal 
aliens in the workforce, whether they are temporary or permanent 
workers, or their occupations. It is assumed, however, that the 
intensity of illegal alien employment is greater in the INS sample.
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As was shown in chapter 4, apprehended illegal aliens employed 
in the Chicago metropolitan area are disproportionately, low- 
skilled recent migrants from non-English speaking countries with 
presumably limited information about the U.S. labor market. Many 
view their stay in the U.S. as temporary and hence they have less 
incentive than permanent settlers to invest in skills specific to the 
U.S. labor market. This encourages ethnic enclave employment, 
which provides a sheltered environment for those not making 
U.S.-specific investments and a transition work environment for 
other illegal ah"en workers.
Employment in an ethnic enclave is also encouraged by the 
nontrivial expected cost of being deported and then returning to the 
U.S. Although the probability that an illegal alien who has success 
fully penetrated the border will be "detected" (arrested) in the 
interior is low, it is greater than zero and a constant concern of 
illegal aliens. The cost to the illegal alien of an apprehension, 
deportation and return to the U.S. is also relatively low for a 
Mexican national, but it is higher for other illegal aliens. The 
incentive to avoid detection encourages employment in areas where 
they, or their illegal status, will be less visible to the immigration 
enforcement authorities. This would also encourage ethnic enclave 
employment if there is a large group of legal resident ah"ens and U.S. 
citizens of the same national origin with whom the illegal aliens can 
"blend."
The temporary nature of much illegal migration and the incen 
tives to leave dependent family members in the country of origin 
also affect seasonally of employment. Illegal aliens have an incen 
tive to prefer jobs in which there is little penalty for interrupted 
employment during long visits outside the U.S. While jobs with 
little firm-specific or U.S.-specific training partially satisfy this 
condition, more preferable would be seasonal jobs in which wage 
rates and employment are greater in the "on season" and, by 
definition, much lower in the "off season." Because of the lower 
costs of return or cyclical migration, the Mexican illegal aliens
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would exhibit a greater labor supply for seasonal jobs than other 
illegal aliens.
Illegal alien employers are believed to have a low degree of 
unionization. It is often alleged that one purpose of hiring illegal 
aliens is to thwart unionization efforts. Furthermore, to the extent 
that unions raise wage rates, establishments have an incentive to 
employ higher-skilled workers so as to reduce, if not close, the gap 
between the union wage and worker productivity. In addition, 
higher-skilled native workers may be more readily available at the 
union wage. Finally, native workers may use the unionization of 
their establishment as a mechanism for reducing competition from 
illegal ah'en workers by excluding them from the hiring process.
The media and popular literature also portray illegal aliens as 
working for smaller, more informal business establishments in 
which the decisionmaker is the owner rather than for establishments 
that are part of a larger enterprise. These smaller, private establish 
ments are more likely to have informal hiring requirements and 
hence would be less concerned with the legal status of their workers.
These considerations, some of which refer primarily to temporary 
workers and others primarily to the illegal status of the workers, 
suggest several testable hypotheses. It is hypothesized that illegal 
alien employers (ILLEMP) are less unionized (UNION), less likely 
to be a branch or subsidiary of a larger firm (SUBBR), and 
maintain a seasonal pattern to employment (SEASONAL). The 
ethnic enclave hypothesis suggests that the owners are more likely 
to be Hispanic (HISPOWN) and the co-workers of Hispanic or 
Asian origin (MINORRACE).6 Table 5-1 presents an explanation 
of the variables and their codes. 7
Because of missing observations, the regression analysis of the 
differences between the INS sample and the general sample has 399 
observations, 7 less than the full sample. The sample used for the 
comparison of establishments includes 189 illegal alien employers 
and 210 employers from the general sample. The means and 
standard deviations of the variables are reported in table 5-2. The
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employers identified by an illegal alien are, on average, three times 
the size of the general sample of employers, and this may well be the 
result of the sampling methodology. Some of the other explanatory 
variables, however, vary with establishment size, such as degree of 
unionization and whether the establishment is a branch/subsidiary 





ILLEMP Employer identified by an apprehended illegal 
alien = 1; otherwise=0.
Independent Variables
SIZE, SIZESQ Total number of employees, and its square.
UNION Percentage of nonsupervisory employees who are
union members.
MANUF, Industry of establishment: manufacturing and 
REST, construction; restaurant; other service. 
SERVICE
SUBBR Type of ownership subsidiary or branch = 1;
otherwise=0. 
SEASONAL Dummy for existence of patterns of seasonal
employment = 1; otherwise=0. 
HISPOWN Dummy for Hispanic ownership = 1; otherwise=0.
MINORRACE Percentage of employees who are of Hispanic or 
____________Asian origin._______________________
and the greater frequency of branch and subsidiary establishments 
in the illegal alien employer sample may not reflect a partial effect 
(i.e., controlling for establishment size) but rather the larger size.
The multivariate regression analyses of the dichotomous variable 
ILLEMP, are reported in tables 5-3 and 5-4 using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) procedures and in table 5-5 using logit analysis. 
Tables 5-3 and 5-4 differ merely by the inclusion of the variable for 
the ethnic composition of the workforce (MINORRACE) in the 
former. This variable is potentially endogenous. An establishment is 
more likely to have a larger proportion of minority workers if it was
II. Differences Between Illegal Alien Employers and Other Employers 117
identified by a minority worker. There is virtually no difference in 
the interpretations derived from these two tables. The OLS analysis 
is to be preferred over the logit analysis for its simplicity of 
presentation and interpretation, but the standard errors are biased 
by heteroskedastic residuals. The logit analysis corrects for the bias
Table 5-2
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables 














































































in the standard errors. In general, the two procedures give the same 
results in this study.8 Column (1) in tables 5-3, 5-4 and 5-5 is for all 
industries, columns (2) to (4) are separate analyses by industry. A 
Chow-test for the OLS regressions indicates that the structures of 
the equations differ significantly across the three industries (table 
5-3 equations, observed F-statistic F=10.3).
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Table 5-3
Regression Analysis of Characteristics of
Employers—Ordinary Least Squares
Analyses Controlling for the Racial Composition of Employees3 









































































































a. A Chow test of the null hypothesis of identical structures across the three industry types 
is rejected. The calculated F-value is 10.28, the critical value is F(8,363; .01) = 2.55.
b. Regression coefficient = stated coefficient x 10"7 . 
n.a. = variable not entered in the equation, 
t-ratios are in parentheses.
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Table 5-4
Regression Analysis of Characteristics of
Employers—Ordinary Least Squares Analyses





































































































a. Regression coefficient = stated coefficient x 10~7 . 




Logit Analysis of Characteristics of
Employers—Maximum Likelihood Estimation




































































































a. Actual coefficient = stated coefficient x 10 
n.a. = variable not entered in the equation, 
t-ratios are in parentheses.
,-6
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In these data, the illegal alien employers are larger, that is, they 
have more employees (SIZE), than the general sample employers, 
even when other variables are the same. The probability that the 
employer was drawn from the illegal alien sample rises with the 
number of employees in each industry in the range of the data. To 
some extent this may reflect a substitution of a larger number of 
lower-skilled illegal alien workers for capital (both physical capital 
and skills per worker), other things the same. It is, however, also 
consistent with the bias in establishment size generated by the 
sampling methodology. At this stage it is not possible to separate 
the effects of these competing hypotheses.
Controlling for establishment size, the greater the degree of 
unionization (UNION), the higher the probability that the estab 
lishment was identified by an apprehended illegal alien.9 This effect 
is significant in the all industries (pooled) analysis and for nonres- 
taurant services. Tests for nonlinearities in the effect of unionization 
did not result in additional statistically significant findings.
Restaurants that are independently owned, as distinct from a 
branch or subsidiary of a larger firm, are more likely to be 
employers of illegal aliens, but only when the racial/ethnic compo 
sition of the workforce is held constant. 10 Otherwise there is no 
effect of type of ownership on whether the establishment is in the 
INS sample.
There is a tendency for the employers of illegal aliens to be more 
likely to report seasonal patterns (SEASONAL) in their employ 
ment. For the sample pooled across industries, in other services, and 
in the logit analysis for manufacturing, the employers indicating 
seasonality were more likely to be from the illegal ah'en sample. 
There is no significant difference in seasonality reported for the 
restaurant sector. As one would expect, the "off season" is most 
intense in the winter (December to February). A distinguishing 
feature between the two samples of employers, however, is the 
greater incidence of the fall (September to November) being part of 
the "off season" for the illegal alien employers. 11 This does not
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reflect the greater incidence of lawn care services in the illegal alien 
sample. When a dichotomous control variable for lawn care service 
is included in the equation, the slope coefficient of the seasonal 
variable is reduced, but it is still large and highly significant.
In summary, the employers in the INS sample in manufacturing 
and other services are more likely to report seasonality in employ 
ment, and if they do, the off season is longer than in the general 
sample. It should be remembered though that workers may, by 
choice have a seasonal pattern in their employment, even if there is 
no seasonality for the establishment.
Although there are very few Hispanic owners, this variable 
appears to be significant in manufacturing. 12 Among manufacturing 
establishments in the OLS analysis, Hispanic owners are more likely 
to be in the INS sample. The significant Hispanic owner coefficient 
with an unexpected sign in the restaurant sample in table 5-3 
disappears when the ethnic composition of the workers is deleted in 
table 5-4.
The extent to which Hispanics and Asians are represented in the 
establishment's workforce (MINORRACE) is an important vari 
able in the analysis. In each of the industrial sectors, the illegal alien 
employers are characterized by having a larger proportion of 
employees who are Hispanic or Asian, even after controlling for 
Hispanic ownership of the establishment. This may reflect the 
greater probability of an employer being included in the illegal alien 
sample the greater the number of illegal aliens. 13 The finding is also 
consistent with an ethnic enclave hypothesis. Illegal aliens, who are 
predominantly of Hispanic or Asian origin, are more likely to work 
in establishments with relatively more Hispanics and Asians, other 
things the same. This interpretation is consistent with the finding for 
manufacturing that Hispanic owners are more likely to be in the 
illegal ah'en sample.
In summary, the employers of illegal aliens have characteristics 
attractive to temporary or new foreign workers—they are more 
likely to have seasonality in employment and be part of an ethnic
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enclave. They are also more highly unionized in the nonrestaurant 
services sector, but not elsewhere. Type of ownership does not 
appear to matter.
///. The Underground Economy
A major concern regarding the employers of illegal aliens is 
whether they operate in the "underground economy." Establish 
ments in the underground economy are not necessarily producing 
illegal goods or services, but rather they organize their activities, 
including recordkeeping, so as to illegally avoid the payment of 
taxes by the firm or its workers, or to illegally avoid compliance 
with health, safety and labor legislation. 14
Illegal aliens and underground-economy employers would tend 
to have an affinity for each other (Simon and Witte, 1982, especially 
chapter 3). Illegal aliens wish to avoid detection by the authorities. 
Many lack valid social security numbers, others have fraudulently 
obtained access to valid social security numbers. Even if they and 
their employers make contributions to social insurance programs, 
(e.g., social security, unemployment compensation, and workers' 
compensation), the illegal aliens may be too fearful to apply for 
benefits, or may be denied the benefits even if they do apply. As 
low-skilled and non-English speaking new entrants to the U.S. 
labor market, their productivity may be so low that the sacrifice of 
health and safety conditions may be viewed by them as a small price 
to pay for getting a job which may offer low wages by U.S. 
standards, but high wages compared to their alternatives in the 
country of origin.
Employers could not be asked directly if they are part of the 
underground economy. First, there is no hard and fast distinction 
between these employers and other or "above-ground" employers. 
Rather, one may think in terms of varying degrees of subterranean 
activities; probably no two employers not in full compliance are 
alike in their behavior. Second, positive responses to direct ques 
tions on recordkeeping, payment of taxes, income tax withholding,
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etc., would necessarily be suspect. However, the survey included 
two questions that can be used to gauge the extent of participation 
in the underground economy. One is whether workers were paid in 
cash or by check. The other is the extent to which workers hired in 
the past year were required to have a social security number. The 
emphasis is on actual hiring practice rather than on stated hiring 
procedures because an earlier survey (Chiswick and Fullam, 1980) 
revealed considerable disparity between the two.
A characteristic of the underground economy is a preference for 
transactions in cash rather than by check, as the latter leaves a 
paper trail. While there is no one-to-one correspondence between 
payment of workers in cash and participation in the underground 
economy, there is a presumption that those who do pay by cash are 
more likely to be eschewing proper recordkeeping and payment of 
required taxes. Thus, the payment of wages in cash (in part or in 
total) for workers in the most common male nonsupervisory job 
may serve as a proxy for being part of the underground economy. 
There are, of course, two deficiencies with this proxy. First, the 
method of payment for illegal aliens may differ from the payment 
method for the most common male nonsupervisory job. Cash 
payment may be more common for the former than the latter. 
Second, by limiting the sample to establishments with five or more 
employees, the study excludes very small establishments and house 
hold employers, perhaps the types of employers most likely to pay 
workers in cash.
Of the 402 employers responding to the question on method of 
payment, only 3.2 percent (13 employers) reported paying part or 
all of the wages in cash rather than entirely by check or its modern 
equivalent, electronic transfer of funds. 15 In the INS sample, 3.6 
percent of the establishments reported payment in cash in contrast 
to the 2.9 percent in the general sample. The difference is very small 
and not statistically significant. Most of the employers paying in 
cash were in the restaurant sector (11 of the 13) where the practice 
was most common among the smaller restaurants.
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Thus, acknowledging payment of wages in cash for the most 
common male nonsupervisory job appears to be rare in manufac 
turing and service jobs, but not uncommon (about 12 percent) in the 
restaurant sector. There does not appear to be a difference in this 
practice between the employers identified by the illegal aliens and 
randomly selected employers.
Another index of participation in the underground economy is 
whether the employer required workers hired in the past year to 
have a social security number. The question on the proportion of 
hires required to have a social security number was included in a list 
of actual hiring requirements. All of the establishments in the 
sample were covered by the social security program and a social 
security number is used as the taxpayer identification number for 
the federal and state income tax. Thus, full compliance with the 
federal and state tax law would require obtaining the social security 
number of each person hired.
Of the 375 employers who hired workers in the past year and 
responded to the question, only 10 (2.7 percent) reported that they 
required social security numbers from less than 100 percent of the 
workers hired. 16 Among those who were not in full compliance, 40 
percent did not require it for any of their hires. The proportion of 
establishments not requiring the number for all new hires was 3.3 
percent for the INS sample and 2.1 percent for the general sample 
of employers, and the difference is not statistically significant. 
Although the sample sizes become small, it appears that lack of full 
compliance is more common among the illegal alien employers in 
manufacturing (4 out of 71 employers or 6.0 percent) than in the 
other sectors.
In summary, the two proxy measures for participation in the 
underground economy, paying workers in cash and not requiring all 
newly hired workers to provide a social security number, suggest 
that few employers of five or more workers engage in these 
practices. Although illegal alien employers may participate some 
what more in the underground economy than randomly selected
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employers, the differences are very small and are not statistically 
significant. The most striking pattern is the greater frequency of 
payment of part or all of wages in cash in both samples in the 
restaurant sector (about 12 percent of the establishments). This is a 
sector in which receipts are often primarily or entirely in cash and 
where monitoring of sales by the tax authorities would be difficult.
IV. On-the-Job Training
The extent to which illegal aliens receive on-the-job training in 
the U.S. is important for their labor market adjustment, that is, the 
progress of their earnings, employment and occupational status 
with duration of residence. It is also important for analyzing their 
permanence in or degree of attachment to the U.S. labor market. 
The greater the extent of their investment in training specific to their 
U.S. employer, their U.S. industry or the U.S. economy, as distinct 
from perfectly internationally transferable training, the smaller the 
likelihood of their returning to their country of origin.
Illegal aliens have a smaller incentive, compared to legal immi 
grants and natives, for making investments in skills that have U.S. 
specificity. Skills specific to the U.S. are, by definition, of lesser 
value in the country of origin. Thus, to the extent that illegal aliens 
view themselves as only temporary migrants, these investments 
would be less attractive. Even if the illegal aliens would like to plan 
a permanent residency in the U.S., there is always the possibility of 
apprehension and deportation. In addition, even if the deported 
illegal alien subsequently returns, the particular job may no longer 
be available. To reduce the probability and cost of deportation, 
many illegal aliens leave dependent family members in the home 
country and may return home for lengthy visits (see, for example, 
Cornelius, 1976 and Diez-Canedo, 1980). Skills specific to the U.S. 
tend to depreciate during a return visit lasting several months and 
a new job may have to be found after returning to the U.S.
For similar reasons, employers of illegal aliens would be more 
reluctant to finance part of the firm-specific component of on-
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the-job training of illegal aliens. Concerns regarding voluntary 
return visits and deportation add to the degree of uncertainty as to 
whether an illegal alien in whose skills the establishment has made 
investments will remain with the firm long enough for the invest 
ment to be profitable.
As a result of these employee and employer incentives, it is 
hypothesized that illegal aliens are likely to have fewer skills 
acquired on the job that are specific to the U.S. Although the 
earnings of illegal aliens were analyzed in chapter 4, earnings reflect 
general as well as specific job skills, and include the skills and 
knowledge acquired merely by living in an area. There are no direct 
data on the 1-213 or in the employer survey on the extent of 
on-the-job training received by (or invested in) the illegal aliens. The 
survey does include information on the number of business days of 
training in the establishment that a newly-hired worker generally 
requires to learn to do well the most common male nonsupervisory 
job. The question was asked for workers with no prior experience in 
the job and for those with prior experience, without being more 
specific about the nature or duration of the prior experience. These 
data can be used to test for differences in the degree of on-the-job 
training.
The statistical test is performed by regressing the variable 
ILLEMP on the days of training reported by the establishment, 
controlling for the total number of employees. The control for 
establishment size is important, as the extent of on-the-job training 
rises with the size of the establishment (Barren, Block, and Lowen- 
stein, 1987). Larger firms or establishments are more likely to be 
able to internalize the benefits from firm-specific training because of 
greater opportunities for job mobility within the firm and lower quit 
rates.
There are also systematic differences in the skill level of the most 
common male nonsupervisory job; the occupational level is sub 
stantially lower in the INS sample than in the general sample (table 
5-6). Among the manufacturing establishments, only 15.1 percent
Table 5-6
Cross-Tabulation of Most Common Male Nonsupervisory 



































































































































































NOTES: Entries in the table are cell counts with the cell value as a percent of the column total in parentheses.
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of the illegal alien employers in contrast to 31.3 percent of the 
general sample employers reported that this job was in the profes 
sional, technical or skilled production worker category. Among the 
establishments in the service sector (excluding restaurants), the 
proportions were 16.2 percent and 64.9 percent, respectively. More 
highly skilled jobs generally require a longer period of firm-specific 
training.
There is a very large difference between the average number of 
days of training to learn to do.the job well for workers with and 
without prior experience in the job. For workers with no prior 
experience the training is both general and firm-specific, and the 
mean is 156 days. For workers with prior experience, the training is 
presumably predominantly firm-specific, and the number of days of 
training is only 45. Given employee and employer aversion to 
firm-specific training for illegal aliens, it is to be expected that illegal 
aliens will work in establishments with jobs that require fewer days 
of specific training.
Controlling only for the size of the establishment, jobs that 
require a longer training period are significantly less likely to be in 
the INS sample. 17 This is not merely a consequence of the occupa 
tional mix of the most common male nonsupervisory job. When 
dichotomous variables are used to control statistically for the seven 
major occupational categories, the regression coefficients on days of 
training remain negative. Although the coefficients are smaller, the 
effect is still statistically significant for workers with prior experi 
ence.
Thus, the data are consistent with the hypothesis that male illegal 
aliens work for employers who provide less on-the-job training.
V. Perceptions of Legal Hiring Requirements
The respondent was the person in charge of hiring for the most 
common male nonsupervisory job. The survey included a series of 
questions about the respondent's understanding of the legal liabil-
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ities regarding the hiring of illegal aliens. The stub in table 5-7 
repeats the 11 questions in the order in which they were asked. Of 
the 11 questions, 2 referred to the age of the worker to be hired, 2 
referred to females, 1 referred to the handicapped, 2 referred to 
union membership, 1 referred to aliens, and 3 referred to illegal 
aliens. The nonimmigrant questions served two functions: to pro 
vide a benchmark for interpreting responses, and to mask the 
study's interest in illegal aliens. The columns in table 5-7 indicate 
the percent of respondents who reported "Yes, Currently the Law" 
for each of three categories of employers, that is, the general sample 
and the INS sample by whether the identifying alien was a Mexican 
national.
Most of the establishments reported that they believed it was not 
legal to "refuse to hire" older workers, the handicapped, pregnant 
women, women in strenuous jobs, and union members. The term 
"refuse to hire" may have encouraged the negative responses. A 
smaller proportion, but still a majority of respondents reported that 
they believed they could not legally refuse to hire a person who is 
not a U.S. citizen. At the time, however, it was legal to discriminate 
on the basis of alienage. 18
About two-thirds of the illegal alien employers reported that they 
thought they were required to check the visa of noncitizen job 
applicants. Nearly 9 out of 10 employers in the general sample gave 
this response. In fact, there was no legal requirement at the time of 
the survey to check or verify the legal status of new hires. These high 
rates are not simply a response to a question on requirements "to 
check," as the affirmative responses on checking the age of job 
applicants are much lower. Only 20 to 25 percent of illegal alien 
employers reported that an employer may knowingly hire an illegal 
alien, in contrast to 15 percent in the general sample. For "har 
boring" (providing a residence and a job) the responses were under 
20 percent and 10 percent, respectively. 19
Thus, most employers believed it was not legal to refuse to hire 
aliens; however, they believed there was an affirmative requirement 
to check an alien's visa for legal status and that it was not legal












































































































knowingly to hire illegal aliens. The general sample employers were 
more averse to aliens—they were more likely to believe they could 
refuse to hire aliens, were more likely to believe they were required 
to check an alien's legal status, and less likely to believe they could 
legally hire illegal aliens. 20 In the INS sample, differences in 
responses between employers identified by a Mexican national and 
other illegal alien employers are generally smaller and show no 
consistent pattern.
Assuming these responses are truthful, they do not offer much 
encouragement for the "announcement effect" of the employer 
sanctions introduced by the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986. The 1984 survey indicates that most employers, even in the 
INS sample, were already under the impression that they were 
required to check an alien's legal status and that it was against the 
law to hire illegal aliens. Thus, they believed that employer sanc 
tions were already the law of the land. While this perception may 
have inhibited the employment opportunities of illegal aliens, as 
suggested by the difference between the INS sample and the general 
sample, it did not close them. Presumably the respondents violating 
what they believed to be legal prohibitions against hiring illegal 
aliens perceived the probability of detection and the penalties if 
detected to be sufficiently small or nonexistent.
VI. Summary
The analysis in this chapter indicates areas of similarity and 
differences between the sample of establishments identified by an 
apprehended illegal alien and the establishments randomly selected 
from industry directories. It was not possible to remove from the 
general sample establishments that employ illegal aliens. As a result, 
the methodology biases downward differences between employers 
of illegal aliens and those who do not employ illegal aliens.
There was little systematic difference in the willingness of the two 
types of establishments to participate in the survey, or in their 
willingness to respond to particular questions.
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The illegal alien employer characteristics are consistent with a 
model that emphasizes the temporary and relatively recent migra 
tion of the aliens. Their employers are more likely than the general 
sample of employers to exhibit seasonal employment patterns in 
nonrestaurant services, particularly a longer "off season" in the fall. 
They are more likely to be part of an ethnic-enclave economy—their 
employers in manufacturing are more likely to be Hispanic and a 
greater proportion of their workers are Hispanic or of Asian origin. 
Apprehended illegal aliens are more heavily concentrated in the 
restaurant and lawn care industries and apparently are least repre 
sented in sectors requiring higher levels of skill, especially skills 
specific to the U.S. such as fluency in English.
The two samples of establishments differed in the extent to which 
they provided on-the-job training. The illegal alien employers 
provided significantly fewer days of training, and the difference 
between the INS and general sample establishments is larger for 
firm-specific training than for all on-the-job training. The difference 
in the amount of training in the two samples was smaller, but still 
substantial, when the skill level of the workforce was held constant. 
The skill level of the workers is considerably lower in the establish 
ments known to have employed an illegal alien.
The illegal nature of the presence of the aliens in the U.S. labor 
market does not appear to be an important direct determinant of 
their employment patterns; they are not more likely to work in 
newer or "fly-by-night" establishments, they are not more likely to 
work for independently owned establishments, and they are not 
more likely to work in the underground economy, to the extent this 
can be measured. For example, the payment of workers in part or 
entirely in cash appears to be the same in the INS and the general 
sample. Payment in cash is now rare in all sectors, except for small 
restaurants.
Most establishments believed it was illegal to hire an illegal alien 
and that they were required to check the visa status of noncitizen 
job applicants. These perceptions of the law were somewhat
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stronger in the general sample than in the INS sample, yet both 
perceptions were incorrect at the time of the survey. These percep 
tions, which might be viewed as an "announcement effect" of 
employer sanctions, apparently did not play a major role in 
reducing job opportunities for illegal aliens. This is a further 
indication that their illegal status per se did not detract from the job 
opportunities of the illegal aliens. It also suggests that the mere 
introduction of employer sanctions may not have a significant 
deterrent effect. For the sanctions to have an impact may require 
substantial resources devoted to enforcement and substantial pen 
alties when violations are detected.
NOTES
1 Because of concerns over "interviewer effects," that is, interviewer attitudes or 
behavior influencing survey responses, a double-blind interviewing procedure 
was utilized. Neither the interviewers nor the establishments knew of the study's 
interest in illegal aliens or the specific lists from which the employer names and 
addresses were selected.































3 When the dependent variable ILLEMP is unity for the INS sample employers 




















Mean age of establishments is 6.05 years.
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6 An establishment is coded as owned by an Hispanic if one or more of the owners, 
partners or family corporation stockholders is Hispanic. There were virtually no 
Asian owners in the sample. Many Asian-owned businesses have fewer than five 
employees and hence would not be eligible for inclusion in the survey.
7 The data under study are not suitable for testing the hypothesis that the 
establishments in the INS sample have fewer employees. Because of the sampling 
procedure, the probability that an establishment is in the INS sample is greater 
the larger the number of its employees, while the probability that an establish 
ment is in the general sample is virtually independent of the number of 
employees. Thus, the sampling procedures bias the sample in favor of larger 
employers of illegal aliens. The variable for size is included in the analysis, in a 
quadratic form, to control statistically for the effects of this feature of the 
sampling methodology. The coefficients of the other explanatory variables in the 
regression analysis measure partial effects when the number of employees is held 
constant.
8 This is not surprising. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981, p. 278-279) show that when 
the average value of a dichotomous dependent variable is around 0.5, as it is in 
this study, OLS tends to give results which are very similar to logit.
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9 It is not known whether the illegal alien is a union member.
10 A franchise was classified as independently owned or a branch/subsidiary 
depending on whether the holder of the franchise was an independent operator 
or a firm that owned or controlled more than one establishment.
1 ' Partial effect of seasonality on whether the employer is from the illegal alien 

















































a. Controlling for size, degree of unionization, type of ownership, ethnicity of owner, and 
proportion of Hispanics and Asians in the workforce. Entries are OLS regression 
coefficients with t-ratios in parentheses.
b. The "on season" dichotomous variable is unity if the employer reported no seasonality 
or if the employer reported that two of the three months in the quarter are months of 
high employment.
12 The proportion of owners classified as Hispanic is 6.3 percent for restaurants, 1.8 
percent for.manufacturing, 1.4 percent for other services, and 2.8 percent overall.
13 This could arise even if INS did not target employer raids on larger establish 
ments that employ illegal aliens.
14 The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act makes it illegal for an employer 
to knowingly hire illegal aliens and requires employers to check although not 
validate the authenticity of certain documents to ascertain the job applicant's 
legal status. The legislation is likely to increase the size of the underground 
economy. Enforcement of the employer sections provisions will be difficult, and 
will be particularly difficult against employers who also violate payroll tax and 
income tax withholding requirements.



































a. Payment of part or all of wages in cash.
b. Includes checks, vouchers and direct deposit.
c. Includes one establishment in other services and one in manufacturing.
Although 9 percent of the INS sample and 15 percent of the general sample of 
restaurants reported cash payments, the difference disappears when restaurant 
size is held constant.
16 Distribution of employers by the proportion of new hires required to have a 
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a. Dependent variable is ILLEMP, also controlling for SIZE and SIZESQ.
b. Dependent variable is ILLEMP, also controlling for SIZE, SIZESQ, and the occupa 
tion of the most common male nonsupervisory job.
c. Business days of training if the worker had no prior experience (TRNOPRIOR) and if 
the worker had prior experience (TRYESPRIOR) in the job. Four separate regressions 
are estimated.
18 The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 makes this form of 
discrimination illegal.
19 The response rate ("yes" or "no" responses as a proportion of the sample) was 
lowest for this question, 83 percent. For all other questions on hiring require 
ments it ranged from about 90 percent to 97 percent.

6 
The Labor Market and Public Policy
This book has analyzed the employment and employers of illegal 
aliens in an urban labor market. By concentrating on the Chicago 
labor market, it could analyze employment in a diverse set of 
sectors for illegal aliens from Mexico and other countries of origin. 
The immediate purpose of the study was to increase substantially 
the conceptual and empirical knowledge regarding the labor market 
adjustment of illegal aliens and hence their impact on the U.S. 
economy. This also sheds light on the broader issues of the 
adjustment and impact of legal immigrants and the functioning of 
the U.S. labor market. The study uses unique matched employee- 
employer data on illegal aliens. In spite of recent developments in 
labor market data, matched employee-employer data are still very 
rare.
The analyses reported in the previous chapters have implications 
for survey research methodology, understanding the illegal alien 
labor market, and the likely impacts of the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986.
/. The Setting
The illegal alien labor market is discussed in chapter 2. Illegal 
immigration arises from a divergence between the economic and 
other incentives for international migration and the migration that 
is permitted by U.S. immigration law. Both issues were discussed. 
Among those who cannot migrate legally in spite of their wishes to 
do so, only some choose to become illegal aliens. Illegal aliens tend
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to be low-skilled young adult workers unaccompanied by depen 
dent family members from low-income countries with close prox 
imity to the U.S.
It has been estimated that in 1980 there were 3.5 to 6.0 million 
illegal aliens in the U.S., of whom about half were Mexican 
nationals. Their number has increased since then. Illegal aliens have 
a high labor force participation rate, and by 1986 there may have 
been as many as 4 million in the U.S. labor market, or about 4 
percent of the labor force.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 was enacted 
as a result of the obvious inability of the then-current policy to stem 
the flow of illegal aliens. The legislation introduced penalties against 
employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens and offered amnesty to 
illegal aliens who resided continuously in the U.S since before 
January 1982. It is not likely that the 1986 Act will end illegal 
immigration since the incentives are still so strong. It will take some 
time before the implications of the Act's provisions are well 
understood. 1
//. Survey Methodology
The survey procedures were developed and analyzed in chapter 3. 
The analysis is based on two data sets that are partially merged. One 
data set is a sample of employed male illegal aliens randomly 
selected from the population of illegal aliens apprehended in 1983 
by the Chicago District Office of the Immigration and Naturaliza 
tion Service (INS). Data on the demographic and labor market 
characteristics of the illegal aliens were successfully abstracted and 
coded from the Record of Deportable Alien, INS form 1-213. 
Non-Mexican illegal aliens were oversampled relative to those of 
Mexican origin to provide a sufficiently large sample for statistical 
analysis.
The illegal aliens' responses to the 1-213 question on the name 
and address of their current or most recent employer generated a 
sample of establishments that have employed illegal aliens. Another
III. The Illegal Alien Labor Market
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sample was randomly selected from industry directories, matched 
by major industry category—manufacturing, restaurant, and other 
services. A double-blind survey procedure was employed in that 
neither the respondent at the establishment nor the interviewer 
knew that half of the sample was drawn from information provided 
by illegal aliens. The respondent was the person in charge of hiring 
workers for the most common male nonsupervisory job.
This unique survey methodology was very successful. The most 
conservative measure of the completion rate for the employer 
survey is the number of completed interviews as a percent of all 
sample cases not known to be ineligible. The rate was 77 percent 
overall; 76 percent for the establishments identified in the INS files 
and 79 percent in the general sample. There was a low incidence, 
with little difference between the two sample sources, of either 
partial interviews or item nonresponse. Indeed, the establishment 
respondents seemed generally eager to participate.
The success of the survey research methodology should be 
encouraging to those whose research questions require matched 
employee-employer data. There is nothing in the methodology that 
would suggest that the success was limited to the particular 
characteristics of the Chicago metropolitan area or of the illegal 
alien labor market. Since so many labor market research studies 
require matched employee-employer data to properly test their 
hypotheses, this project offers hope for future progress in this area
///. The Illegal Alien Labor Market
The analysis of the illegal alien labor market produces many rich 
and robust findings.
When the illegal alien is treated as the unit of observation, as in 
chapter 4, it is possible to study wage determination, job mobility, 
and employer exploitation, among other issues. The analysis of 
wages shows that the illegal alien's skills clearly matter. Aliens with 
more labor market experience in the home country, with more
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experience in the U.S., and with a longer job tenure with their 
current (or recent) U.S. employer have higher wages, with the effect 
of the experience being greater the more closely it relates to their 
current employment. The wages of illegal aliens are also higher if 
they work for more "desirable" employers. These include establish 
ments that are unionized, pay higher wages for the same formal 
level of skill, and have a more highly skilled workforce.
Illegal aliens who entered the U.S. with student visas seem to 
have lower wages, possibly because combining schooling with labor 
market activities constrains the set of available job opportunities. 
The restaurant sector appears to offer lower money wages than 
either manufacturing or other services, but the value of free meals 
and tip income may not have been included in the wages reported 
by the aliens.
The illegal aliens exhibit considerable job mobility. Those who 
have been in the U.S. for a longer period of time have presumably 
acquired more knowledge and skills relevant for the U.S. labor 
market. It is found that they are more likely to be working in the 
higher paid manufacturing sector, and to be working for a larger, 
more highly unionized establishment that has a higher wage 
structure (if worker skills are held constant) and a more highly 
skilled workforce. The European and Canadian illegal aliens are 
more likely to work for the most desirable establishments.
Mexican illegal aliens display employment characteristics that 
would be associated with temporary migrants. They are more likely 
to work for establishments with seasonal employment patterns. 
Among all the illegal aliens, those of Mexican origin experience the 
lowest cost of to-and-fro migration, and the lowest cost of attempt 
ing another re-entry if apprehended at the border. Seasonal em 
ployment may dovetail nicely with the Mexican illegal aliens' 
preference for jobs that permit long visits to their families in 
Mexico.
The Mexican illegal aliens, much more than others, also exhibit 
ethnic enclave patterns of employment. Ethnic-enclave employment
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requires fewer U.S.-specific skills and is therefore better suited to a 
temporary migrant population for which large destination-specific 
human capital investments would not be cost-effective. It is facili 
tated by the very large Mexican or Hispanic community in Chicago, 
which can sustain substantial ethnic enclave employment. While 
easing an initial or temporary adjustment to the U.S labor market, 
ethnic enclave employment may retard the subsequent "American 
ization" of their skills.
The extent to which illegal aliens are "exploited" by employers 
has been a subject of lively debate. To some, exploitation means the 
payment of wages below the legal minimum. This study indicates 
that the payment of below-minimum wage rates to illegal aliens is 
rare and is more common in the restaurant sector. It should be 
noted, however, that the value of free meals and tips may not have 
been included in the reported wages for workers in the restaurant 
sector and that a lower legal minimum is applicable in this sector. In 
addition, below-minimum wages are associated with recency of 
arrival in the U.S. Thus, to the extent that wage payments below the 
legal minimum level exist, they appear to be a temporary experi 
ence.
To some, exploitation means that workers are locked into 
dead-end jobs. The analysis suggests, however, that the substantial 
wage increases with U.S. experience, particularly experience with 
their current employer, is inconsistent with the dead-end job 
hypothesis. Furthermore, the illegal aliens experience considerable 
job mobility, moving on to more attractive jobs as they acquire U.S. 
labor market experience. They undergo favorable job mobility even 
if they remain in an ethnic enclave.
There is no denying that illegal aliens are paid low wages relative 
to the average U.S. worker. But the low wages of illegal aliens do 
not appear to be the result of employer exploitation. Rather, they 
appear to be the result of low skill levels. Most illegal aliens have 
low levels of schooling, limited fluency in English, and are relative 
newcomers in the U.S. labor market. In addition, the skill differ-
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ential is in part a consequence of the lower incentives for the illegal 
aliens and their employers for making job-training investments that 
are specific to the U.S. labor market or their U.S. employer. These 
lower incentives may be a consequence of the realistic expectation 
of a higher probability of return migration, that is, the perceived 
temporary nature of much of the illegal migration.
The establishments known to have employed illegal aliens are 
compared with the randomly selected establishments in chapter 5. 
The general sample includes some establishments that have em 
ployed illegal aliens. As a result, this analysis biases downward the 
magnitude of the true differences between employers of illegal aliens 
and establishments that do not employ them.
The salient differences between the establishments identified by 
the apprehended illegal aliens and the general sample of establish 
ments appear to be that the former concentrate on the employment 
of low-skilled, minority workers and are better suited for the 
employment of temporary workers. The occupational skill level of 
the employees in the INS sample of establishments is considerably 
lower than in the general sample. Their workers also receive less 
on-the-job training from the firm. In particular, the differences in 
training opportunities are most pronounced for firm-specific train 
ing, that is, training that is useful only in the firm in which it is 
acquired.
Seasonal patterns of employment are more common among the 
employers of illegal aliens, and their "off season" tends to be longer. 
They also exhibit more ethnic enclave characteristics. In the INS 
sample, a larger proportion of the workforce is of Hispanic or Asian 
origin; in manufacturing, the owner is more likely to be an 
Hispanic.
Some other characteristics sometimes said to be distinguishing 
features of employers of illegal aliens do not appear to matter. The 
illegal alien employers in this study are not more likely than the 
general sample employers to be part of the underground economy. 
In addition, there is no clear relation between the age of the
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establishment—that is, how long it has been in business—and 
whether it is an employer of illegal ah'ens.
The analysis indicates that the illegal aliens have adapted very 
well to the U.S. labor market. Although there is some industrial, 
occupational and ethnic concentration, these appear to be optimal 
responses to their skills, fluency in English, knowledge of the U.S. 
labor market, proximity to the country of origin, and the temporary 
nature of much of their migration. It would be inappropriate to 
characterize illegal aliens as forming a separate subeconomy, as 
doing jobs that others either do not do or would not do, or as a 
noncompeting group in the labor market.
IV. The Impact of the Immigration Reform and Control Act
This study has several implications for the likely consequences of 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 on the illegal 
ah"en labor market.
The 1986 Act introduces " employer sanctions," that is, penalties 
against employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens. The analysis 
suggest, however, that at most establishments in 1984 the person in 
charge of hiring believed that this was already the law of the land. 
There was little difference in response between the employers 
identified by an apprehended illegal alien and those randomly 
selected from directories. This means that the "announcement 
effect" of the new legislation for deterring the hiring of illegal aliens 
is likely to be minimal. For the legislation to have a significant 
impact, substantial resources may have to be devoted to enforce 
ment, and meaningful penalties will have to be imposed. Consider 
ing the minimal level of enforcement resources appropriated in the 
past for immigration control, particularly enforcement away from 
the border, one may be justifiable skeptical about future appropri 
ations.
The analysis has identified characteristics of establishments that 
are more likely to be hiring illegal aliens. This profile can be used to
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enhance the target efficiency of the resources devoted to enforcing 
employer sanctions. On the other hand, the findings also suggest 
that the employment of illegal aliens is widespread in the low-skilled 
labor market, even though there are pockets of concentration. The 
widespread nature of illegal alien employment will make enforce 
ment more difficult.
It is expected that if there is stringent enforcement of employer 
sanctions, job opportunities and hence wage offers for illegal aliens 
will decrease. The new law includes a " grandfather clause," that is, 
only new hires need to be tested for their legal status, not all 
currently employed workers. This means that illegal aliens who do 
not qualify for or who do not apply for legalization will have greater 
difficulty finding another job. Future flows of illegal aliens will also 
find their job mobility reduced. As a result of reducing the most 
effective instrument against employer exploitation, job mobility, it 
should be expected that the incidence of employer exploitation, in 
the form of wages below the legal minimum level and undesirable 
working conditions, will increase in the future.
Over 2 V* million illegal aliens have acquired legal rights to live 
and work in the United States as a direct result of the amnesty 
offered in the 1986 Act. After a period of time, these now-legalized 
aliens will also be able to sponsor the legal migration of immediate 
family members who have remained in the country of origin or are 
in the U.S. in an illegal status. If so seasonal migration is likely to 
decline and the attachment of the now-legalized aliens to the U.S. 
labor market is likely to increase. It can be expected that as their 
permanent attachment to the U.S. labor market increases, these 
workers will have a greater incentive for making job training 
investments that are more specific to the U.S. labor market and 
their U.S. employers. Their employers will be similarly inclined. The 
likely consequence is greater job training and enhanced occupa 
tional and income mobility for the legalized aliens. They are, 
however, likely to remain relatively low-skilled workers because of 
their low educational attainment.
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If the deterrent affect of employer sanctions on new illegal 
migration is not sufficiently strong, wage opportunities in the 
low-skilled labor market may decrease. This may arise for several 
reasons. First, the legalized aliens are now likely to have a greater 
attachment to the U.S. labor market, reducing both season and 
permanent return migration. This implifies a greater supply of labor 
to the low-skilled labor market. Second, some, and perhaps many, 
of the dependent family members whose immigration is sponsored 
by the now-legalized aliens will enter the labor force. If these are 
predominantly low-skilled workers, perhaps disproportionately fe 
male, the supply of low-skilled workers will expand even further. 
Third, to the extent that employer sanctions are enforced, employ 
ers will have to verify the legal status of each worker hired. The 
verification process is not without cost. In effect, employer sanctions 
are the equivalent of a "hiring tax." Relative to wage rates, the 
"hiring tax" is more burdensome for low-wage workers in part- 
time, high turnover, or seasonal jobs. This will reduce the demand 
for workers in the low-wage, low-skilled labor market.
While the intended direct effect of employer sanctions is to raise 
wages in the low-skilled labor market for workers with legal rights 
to work in this country, the indirect effects have the opposite 
impact. The net impact cannot be determined a priori, and it may 
take several years for the direct and indirect effects to work their 
way through the economic system. Only then may there be a degree 
of certainty as to the net effect of the legislation on wages and job 
opportunities for low-skilled workers.
NOTES
1 For a discussion of the provisions of the 1986 Act, and an analysis of its 
implications for illegal immigration and the labor market see Chiswick (1988).
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Types of Questions in Employer Survey
1. Business Organization—Type of ownership, industry, major product 
or service, age of establishment. Volume of sales, race/ethnicity of 
ower(s) (if not a corporation) and manager of establishment. 
Characteristics of respondent (person in charge of hiring workers 
for the most common male non-supervisory job).
2. Hiring Practices—Number of workers hired in past years, sources 
of these hires (union hiring hall, employment agencies, references 
from employees, walk-ins, etc.), requirements at hiring (includes 
work experience, references, knowledge of English, social security 
number, citizenship or green card, union membership, etc.).
3. Current Employees—Number of employees by sex, race/ethnicity 
and full-time/part-time status. Educational attainment.
4. Characteristics of Compensation—Wage rates overall and by expe 
rience and education, seasonality of employment, unionization, 
on-the-job training, frequency and method of payment.
5. Older Workers, Teenagers, Adult Men, Adult Women, Recent Immi 
grants—(Parallel questions for each group). Number of employees 
and recent hires by sex and race/ethnicity. Number who left and 
reasons for leaving. Questions for recent immigrants (i.e., persons 
who came to the U.S. to stay within the past 5 years), include 
citizenship/visa status, country of origin and, among reasons for 
leaving establishment, apprehension by INS.
6. Understanding of Labor Legislation—Questions regarding under 
standing of legal status of various hiring practices regarding 
women, the handicapped, the aged, union members and immi 
grants.
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